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Could the Benefits of the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Program be Retroactively Curtailed?
GREGORY CRESPI
There is a sharp tension between the expectations that hundreds of thousands
to millions of persons have or will have regarding their right to have their federal
student loan debts forgiven under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”)
program and the legitimate public concerns regarding the large costs and
regressive incidence of the PSLF program’s benefits. In 2017, the Trump
Administration proposed abolishing the PSLF program for future federal Direct
Loans, but this proposal was not adopted. A similar proposal was made in 2019 as
part of the Administration’s fiscal 2020 budget proposal, with little chance of
adoption. But given the large costs of the program, which I estimate will eventually
rise to $12 billion per year or more as an estimated 200,000 people per year who
currently have outstanding federal Direct Loans will eventually seek debt
forgiveness, and given the regressively skewed incidence of its benefits in favor of
relatively affluent mid-career doctors and lawyers, I think that there will be further
legislative curtailment efforts made in 2020 or later by the Trump Administration
or by members of Congress, this time perhaps a more aggressive proposal for
retroactive elimination of the program, or at least a push for a tax law amendment
to include this forgiven debt as taxable income as is now done for debts forgiven
under the other federal income-based loan forgiveness plans.
This Article considers several contractual arguments as well as Constitutional
arguments that opponents of such proposed statutes could offer. The contractual
arguments against retroactive elimination of the PSLF program include arguments
based on: the express loan terms; the implied contractual covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; promissory estoppel; and unconscionability. Some of these
arguments have considerable merit, at least for those Direct Loan borrowers who
can make certain fact-specific showings. Opponents of such legislation might also
be able to invoke constitutional substantive due process concerns under the
authority of the 1986 Supreme Court case of Bowen v. POSSE. They also could
offer a plausible Takings Clause argument against a tax law change if the courts
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choose to regard the PSLF program’s tax exemption for forgiven debt as a
contractual commitment rather than as only a revocable privilege.
This Article does not take a strong normative position on these potential legal
issues. It does, however, suggest a compromise that might fairly balance the
interests at issue: continue the PSLF program in its current form, but repeal the tax
exemption for forgiven debt so as to recapture for the Treasury in a modestly
progressive manner approximately one-quarter to one-third of the benefits of the
debt forgiveness. Such a compromise should probably also include a provision for
spreading the payment of those taxes over at least several years after debt
forgiveness to avoid unduly burdening these persons with a sudden, large tax
liability that is not accompanied by the receipt of funds to pay those taxes.
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Could the Benefits of the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Program be Retroactively Curtailed?
GREGORY CRESPI *
INTRODUCTION
Starting in October of 2017, people began to qualify for tax-exempt
forgiveness of their remaining federal Direct Loan student debt under the
Public Service Loan Forgiveness program (“PSLF program”) after ten years
of public service employment.1 While very few persons have thus far had
their debts forgiven under the program, I estimate in Part III of this Article
that eventually 200,000 or more Direct Loan borrowers will qualify for, and
seek, debt forgiveness each year.
But this anticipated large-scale debt forgiveness may not actually take
place. As I also estimate in Part III, the program’s annual cost to taxpayers
could eventually grow to as large as $12 billion to $18 billion per year, and
its benefits would be regressively skewed in favor of relatively affluent midcareer doctors and lawyers with large loan debts. Recognizing these
significant cost and distributional concerns, the Obama Administration in
2014 proposed to sharply limit the amount of debt that could be forgiven
under the program, but this proposal was not enacted into law.2 The Trump
Administration then, in its first proposed budget in May of 2017, went even
further and called for prospective elimination of the PSLF program for future
Direct Loans, but this proposal also failed to obtain Congressional approval.3
Given the PSLF program’s large projected costs and regressive
distribution of benefits—features which will become much more visible
once substantial debts start being forgiven on a large scale—there will likely
be efforts made by the Trump Administration (or a later administration) or
*
Homer R. Mitchell Endowed Professor in Commercial and Insurance Law, Dedman School of
Law, Southern Methodist University. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of Iowa.
1
Preston Cooper, Everyone Calm Down About Rejected Student Loan Forgiveness Applications,
FORBES (Sep. 25, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/prestoncooper2/2018/09/25/everyonecalm-down-about-rejected-student-loan-forgiveness-applications.
2
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FY 2015 EDUCATION BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION
54
(2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget15/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5FBR-G4L9].
3
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 20 (2017)
[hereinafter TRUMP PROPOSED BUDGET 2017], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2018-BUD.pdf.
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by members of Congress to take even more aggressive action and
retroactively repeal the PSLF program with regard to persons who have
taken out Direct Loans but have not yet been granted debt forgiveness.4 If
this occurs, it will be very disappointing, and in some instances, financially
devastating to the hundreds of thousands—even perhaps millions—of
persons who will not yet have qualified for debt forgiveness by completing
ten years of qualifying public service but who have relied on the availability
of eventual debt forgiveness in making their borrowing and subsequent
employment decisions.
But these people may have some legal recourse against the
implementation of such retroactive legislation if it is signed into law. There
are a number of contractual and constitutional arguments that can be made
against retroactive repeal of the PSLF program, or against elimination of the
current tax exemption for debt forgiven under that program. This Article will
consider those arguments in some detail.
My overall conclusion is that it is unclear whether any of those
arguments against such retroactive legislation would be successful. I believe
that several of those legal arguments do have considerable merit, and one or
more of them may be accepted by the courts at least for a subset of Direct
Loan borrowers. In contrast, while several somewhat plausible legal
arguments against repeal of the tax exemption for debt forgiven under that
program can also be made, they are much less convincing and are unlikely
to prevail.
As a matter of social policy, I think that it is a close and difficult question
as to whether a retroactive repeal of the PSLF program, or a removal of the
tax exemption for debt forgiven under that program, is justified. On the one
hand, hundreds of thousands of indebted graduates over the past decade have
relied, at least in part, on the prospects of debt forgiveness after ten years in
initially deciding to take on these loans, and in then deciding to accept public
service positions that often pay relatively modest compensation.5 The PSLF
program has clearly been successful in encouraging people to choose public
service careers—one of its primary objectives.6 On the other hand, as I will
later demonstrate, the program will soon become very expensive. The annual
costs of this program may eventually reach $12 billion to $18 billion per
year, a substantial sum. In addition, the benefits of that program will be
4
See JASON DELISLE, BROOKINGS INST., THE COMING PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS
BONANZA
3,
5–7
(2016)
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/es_20160922_delisle_evidence_speaks.pdf (discussing that new data indicates
that PSLF is growing rapidly and arguing that policymakers should curtail or even eliminate PSLF).
5
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ISSUE RESOURCES: PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/aba-day/resources/pslf.html
(describing the PSLF program’s effect in making it more feasible for young lawyers with a great deal of
debt to choose careers in public service, which generally pay less than other legal jobs).
6
Id.
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decidedly regressive in their incidence, heavily skewed towards mid-career
doctors and lawyers.7
I do not have strong views or any special insights as to how this tension
should be resolved. I later will suggest for discussion one possible
compromise resolution: continuing the current PSLF program but repealing
the tax exemption for forgiven debt so that approximately one-quarter to
one-third, or more, of the benefits of forgiveness of existing loans will be
recaptured immediately in federal or state income tax revenues. These new
taxes would automatically be imposed in a somewhat progressive manner
given the application of progressive marginal tax rates to higher-debt
borrowers with generally higher incomes in the year of forgiveness. This is
the approach taken under all of the other federal income-based loan
repayment programs, with the taxation of forgiven debt recognized in the
year of forgiveness, and this approach may make sense for the PSLF
program as well.8 If this approach is followed, however, some provision
should be made to allow persons to pay these taxes over at least several years
so as to avoid unduly burdening these persons having debts forgiven with
the imposition of a potentially large tax obligation without funds to pay those
taxes.
The PLSF program9 was enacted in 2007 and went into effect on
October 1 of that year.10 Under this program, a person who meets the
following criteria will be entitled to forgiveness of any principal and interest
balance outstanding11—the person must have borrowed money for education
through a federal Direct Loan;12 worked for a total of 120 months (which
7
DELISLE, supra note 4, at 2 (“Recent figures on budget costs, enrollment, and projected loan
forgiveness all point to a public service loan forgiveness bonanza on the horizon—one that will
significantly distort incentives and pricing in higher education and disproportionately benefit borrowers
with graduate and professional degrees.”).
8
Letter from Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Rep.
Sander
Levin,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
2–4
(Sept.
19,
2008),
http://www.ibrinfo.org/files/Treasury_response_levin.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA4B-TFWD] (explaining
that loans forgiven under certain federal income-based repayment plans would be considered taxable
income, but loans forgiven under the PSLF program would not be considered taxable income).
9
Throughout this Article, I will refer to the statutory Public Service Loan Forgiveness provisions
as a “program” in accordance with commonly accepted parlance. In actuality, however, those provisions
do not really establish a separate loan repayment “program,” but only create a special accelerated debt
forgiveness mechanism that complements the various federal student loan repayment plans.
10
College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 800 (2007)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012)).
11
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(2).
12
Id. § 1087e(m)(1). Federal Direct Loans have been made since 1994 under the Student Loan
Reform Act of 1993, which was included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, tit. IV, § 4021, 107 Stat. 312, 341 (1993) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)).
There are many other student loan programs, including the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP), which was widely used prior to being discontinued in 2010. Under FFELP, the federal
government guaranteed student loans made by private lenders; the Perkins federal loan program; and
various other private, state, and institutional loan programs. See Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL)
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need not be consecutive) in a qualified public service job; and made
regular monthly loan repayments under a qualifying loan repayment plan
after October 1, 2007.15 Moreover, that forgiven debt will not be regarded as
taxable cancellation of indebtedness income, unlike the manner in which
forgiven debt is treated under the several other federal income-based student
loan repayment programs that provide for debt forgiveness.16 The
Department of Education (“DOE”) has subsequently adopted regulations
implementing the PSLF program.17
Only a few people have met the ten-year employment requirement and
have qualified for debt forgiveness over the last few months of 2017 and
through 2018.18 In 2019 and thereafter, the number of people qualifying for
and obtaining debt forgiveness will surely grow rapidly and very
substantially.19 That is, unless the Trump Administration (or a later
Program, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/glossary#letter_f (last
visited Feb. 6, 2019) (defining the FFEL program); Perkins Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/perkins (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) (explaining the Federal
Perkins Loan Program). As of 2011, there were over $489 billion of outstanding FFELP loans taken out
by 23.8 million borrowers, much more than the $350 billion in Direct Loans that were outstanding at that
time (which grew to $963 billion by 2017), and $8.3 billion in outstanding Perkins loans made to 2.9
million borrowers. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). Loans made
under any of these other programs are not eligible for debt forgiveness under PSLF. Which Types of
Federal Student Loans Qualify for PSLF?, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service#eligible-loans
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2019). However, FFELP and Perkins loans can later be consolidated into Direct Loans,
which are eligible for PSLF forgiveness, although any loan repayments made under those programs
before consolidation will not count towards the ten-year repayment period required for eventual debt
forgiveness. Id. A substantial number of borrowers who would otherwise be eligible for PSLF
forgiveness in 2017 (or the following few years) will likely be precluded from eligibility because they
will have incurred their debt under the FFELP or Perkins programs and not timely consolidated it into
Direct Loans upon graduation.
13
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A).
14
Id. § 1087e(m)(1)(B).
15
Id. § 1087e(m)(1)(A)(i–iv).
16
I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (2012) (excluding from the definition of gross income student loans discharged
by reason of the student working for a certain period of time in public service professions).
17
34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).
18
As of December 31, 2018, 58,293 PSLF program debt forgiveness applications had been filed
and had their processing completed, but of those applications only 610 applications–only approximately
1% of those filed, a strikingly low figure–had been approved by the loan servicer, and only 338 borrowers
had had their debt discharges processed. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program Data,
FED.
STUDENT
AID,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/pslf-report.xls (last
visited May 22, 2019). See also Annie Nova, Public Service Loan Forgiveness is Going Wrong for Most
People – Meet Some of Them, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/21/the-educationdepartment-data-shows-how-rare-loan-forgiveness-is.html (describing how only ninety-six out of 30,000
applicants qualified for debt forgiveness as of June 30, 2018).
19
When the PSLF program was enacted into law in 2007, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that “approximately 50,000 new borrowers each year would eventually be eligible for, and
participate in, income-contingent loan forgiveness each year.” H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 72 (2007). It is
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administration) and Congress go beyond the Administration’s current
proposal to prospectively abolish the PSLF program. For instance, they
could instead enact a statute which will deny loan forgiveness not only to
future borrowers, but also to those persons who have previously taken out
Direct Loans and accepted public service employment in reliance on being
able to later utilize the PSLF program, but who have not yet qualified for
debt forgiveness at the time of enactment of such a restrictive statute.20
The Trump Administration’s May 22, 2017 budget proposal tersely
stated that “the Budget eliminates the Public Service Loan Forgiveness
program,”21 but then later stated that “[a]ll student loan proposals apply to
loans originated on or after July 1, 2018, except those provided to borrowers
to finish their current course of study.”22 This proposal therefore would have
applied only prospectively to future Direct Loans taken out after that date
and would even have retained PSLF program debt forgiveness eligibility for
those post-July 1, 2018 Direct Loans that were taken out by persons
completing a course of study that was commenced before that date.23 Direct

not entirely clear from this statement whether the CBO estimate was for the PSLF program alone or for
all borrowers participating in any of the income-contingent repayment plans. Id. It appears likely that
only estimated eventual PSLF forgiveness was included in this estimate. As I will later discuss herein,
this number is likely a substantial underestimate of eventual steady-state borrower participation.
20
The Trump Administration’s first proposed DOE budget called for ending the PSLF program as
part of an overall attempt to reduce the DOE’s budget by $9.2 billion, or 13.5% of the current approved
level of spending. TRUMP PROPOSED BUDGET 2017, supra note 3, at 20; see also Emma Brown et al.,
Trump’s First Full Education Budget: Deep Cuts to Public School Programs in Pursuit of School Choice,
WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trumps-first-fulleducation-budget-deep-cuts-to-public-school-programs-in-pursuit-of-schoolchoice/2017/05/17/2a25a2cc-3a41-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html
(describing
the
Administration’s attempt to reduce the DOE’s budget by $9.2 billion and the implications that budget
reforms have for college students seeking federal loans).
21
TRUMP PROPOSED BUDGET 2017, supra note 3, at 20.
22
Id.
23
Id. The Trump Administration proposal left unclear whether this “current course of study”
exception would apply to Direct Loans taken out to finance subsequent graduate school education by
persons who were still completing their undergraduate programs as of July 1, 2018. Would a graduate
degree that builds directly upon the knowledge obtained in an undergraduate program be regarded as part
of the same “course of study” as the undergraduate program? As examples of this question: How about
a student who obtains a Ph.D. in the same field as his or her undergraduate study? A law degree obtained
following graduation from a pre-law undergraduate program? A medical school degree based upon the
necessary predicate of a pre-med undergraduate curriculum? The proposal was also unclear as to whether
it would apply to pre-July 1, 2018 FFELP or Perkins loans that were consolidated into Direct Loans after
that date. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1) (2012) (outlining the repayment plan for public service
employees).
This 2017 budget proposal for prospectively eliminating the PSLF program was not adopted by
Congress. In March 2019, the Trump Administration released its proposed fiscal 2020 budget which
again called for prospective elimination of the PSLF program on very similar terms to those proposed
earlier, this time rendering ineligible for the program borrowers who take out a new Direct Loan after
July 1, 2020, except for those borrowers who do so to finish a current course of study. WHITE HOUSE, A
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: A BUDGET FOR A BETTER AMERICA, FISCAL YEAR 2020 32 (2019)
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Loan borrowers would therefore have continued to be eligible for PSLF
program debt-forgiveness for any pre-July 1, 2018 loans (and for some
program-completing, post-July 1, 2018 loans) once they met the ten-year
public service employment requirement. Under this proposal, the number of
persons obtaining PSLF program debt forgiveness annually—which will rise
rapidly starting in 2018—would begin to decline very rapidly after 2028
eventually dwindling to close to zero by a few years after that date. However,
this 2017 budget proposal regarding the PSLF program was not adopted by
Congress.
As I will later demonstrate in Part III of this Article, however, the cost
to taxpayers of continuing to provide debt forgiveness to existing Direct
Loan borrowers under the current PSLF debt-forgiveness terms, and with
the current favorable tax treatment of that forgiven debt, may eventually rise
to as much $12 billion to $18 billion per year. This is a much larger sum than
most policymakers have so far expected or that media commentators have
discussed.24 The Trump Administration (or a later Administration) and
Congress will surely be tempted to have any statutory curtailment of the
PSLF program apply retroactively to existing Direct Loan debts not yet
forgiven to avoid a decade of drain on the Treasury, probably totaling well
over $100 billion between 2019 and 2028.25
There will surely be strong political resistance to adopting such a harsh
retroactive measure that would take away PSLF program privileges from
existing borrowers who now expect to eventually qualify for debt
forgiveness. If that resistance proves insurmountable, those persons who
favor such action may decide to instead propose a statutory change to the
[hereinafter
TRUMP
PROPOSED
BUDGET
2019],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf.
24
See, e.g., DELISLE, supra note 4, at 7 (“Policymakers appear to know little about the IncomeBased Repayment program and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness benefit for federal student loans.
That lack of awareness is troubling, as these programs are a major force in how students are financing
their educations.”).
25
Calculating the net savings to the Treasury by retroactive termination of the PSLF program is a
complicated undertaking for several reasons. First of all, most people who would utilize the program’s
debt forgiveness provisions are now enrolled in one or another federal income-based repayment plan and
will, if the PSLF program is terminated, still be able to eventually obtain debt forgiveness, but not until
after twenty or twenty-five years. Gregory Crespi, The Obama Administration’s New “REPAYE” Plan
for Student Loan Borrowers: Not Much Help for Law Graduates, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 323, 332–33
(2017) [hereinafter Crespi (2017)]. So, the amount of debt that each of those people will have left to
forgive after the longer repayment period would have to be estimated, requiring long-term projections of
average salaries. Then, the present value of those forgiven debts would have to be offset from the 2017–
2018 savings. In addition, debts forgiven after twenty or twenty-five years would be regarded as taxable
income under current law. Gregory Crespi, Should We Defuse the ‘Tax Bomb’ Facing Lawyers Who are
Enrolled in Income-Based Student Loan Repayment Plans?, 68 S.C. L. REV. 117, 131 (2016) [hereinafter
Crespi (2016)]. This will significantly reduce the net offset of the savings from retroactive PSLF program
termination. The net impact of these alternative debt forgiveness options would be to significantly reduce
the taxpayer savings from PSLF termination, but it would be difficult to estimate by exactly how much.
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Internal Revenue Code that would also have retroactive impacts so that debt
forgiven under the PSLF program would be treated as taxable cancellation
of indebtedness income in the year the debt is forgiven. This possible change
to the Internal Revenue Code would treat debts forgiven under the PSLF
program in the same manner as debts forgiven under each of the several
other federal income-based student loan programs, thus recapturing
approximately one-quarter to one-third of this forgiven debt in federal or
state income tax payments.26
But would a statute that goes beyond the prior Trump Administration
proposals and retroactively curtails or eliminates PSLF privileges for
existing Direct Loan borrowers, or which changes the tax treatment of debts
forgiven under this program for existing Direct Loan borrowers, be given
legal effect by the courts? Or would those debt forgiveness and tax treatment
privileges be regarded by the courts as contractual obligations of the federal
government, and moreover as contractual obligations that cannot be legally
abrogated by statute given constitutional limitations? These are the questions
that I will consider in this Article.
There is no provision under the PSLF program for persons to formally
enroll in the program prior to filing their application seeking debt
forgiveness.27 This application cannot be filed until they can document that
they have met the required ten-year period of qualifying public service
employment.28 The DOE in 2012 implemented a voluntary certification
procedure through which prospective applicants may have annual periods of
employment certified as qualifying public service employment before filing
an application for debt forgiveness once they have met the ten-year
employment requirement.29 A million borrowers have already availed
26

That forgiven debt would be taxed as income at the debtor’s marginal personal tax rate, which
would generally range from approximately 25% to a maximum of 37%. Id. at 131. In addition, many
states would also impose state income taxes on this forgiven debt once it is recognized as income for
federal tax purposes. Id. I have elsewhere estimated the overall average tax rate that will be imposed on
forgiven debt under the federal income-based loan repayment programs at approximately 33.3%. Id. at
159–60; Gregory Crespi, Will the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law Schools to Continue
to Provide “Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 SMU L. REV. 51, 90 (2014) [hereinafter Crespi
(2014)]. See also Crespi (2017), supra note 25, at 346–47 n.81 (noting that many graduates would have
a larger amount of debt forgiven and therefore would owe more in both state and federal income taxes).
27
See DELISLE, supra note 4, at 3 (“[G]auging enrollment in PSLF is tricky because borrowers can
retroactively claim benefits for work and payments as far back as 2007. . . . [T]he Department developed
an optional certification process in 2012 so that borrowers and the government have more clarity and
certainty about who qualifies and is enrolling in PSLF. Borrowers may . . . submit a form to the
Department documenting their qualifying loan payments, and the Department will determine whether
they qualify for PSLF.”).
28
Id.
29
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB NO. 1845-0110, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (PSLF):
EMPLOYMENT CERTIFICATION FORM, http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/public-serviceemployment-certification-form.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (describing the application process,
eligibility standards and other important information about the PSLF program). See also U.S. DEP’T OF
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themselves of this certification procedure even though there is no
requirement that persons do so in advance of their application for debt
forgiveness.30 The number of new borrowers obtaining such certifications
each year has been growing rapidly in recent years, with 218,223 persons
first receiving an employment certification in 2016,31 a sharp 52.3% increase
over the 143,276 people who first did so in 2015,32 and with another 249,109
persons then first receiving an employment certification in 2017, and with
another 197,496 persons then first receiving an employment certification
during just the first nine months of 2018.33
The fact that people are not required to give the DOE prior notice of
their intent to utilize the PSLF program before they seek to obtain debt
forgiveness means that any advance estimates of how many people will
actually seek debt forgiveness, and how large the amounts of debt forgiven
will be—both individually and in the aggregate—are highly speculative; few
people have yet qualified for forgiveness.34 As previously noted, a
substantial and rapidly growing number of borrowers have indicated their
interest in the program by obtaining one or more of the voluntary annual
employment certifications,35 but this number bears no necessary relationship
to the number of people who will eventually qualify and apply for debt
forgiveness.
The initial number of persons obtaining debt forgiveness after meeting
the ten-year employment requirement after October 1, 2017 has been
small.36 Only those very few Direct Loan borrowers who have held
EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS EMPLOYMENT CERTIFICATION FORMS REPORT (Dec. 31,
REPORT
(2018)],
2016),
[hereinafter
ECF
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/ECFReport.xls (detailing the
number of borrowers who submitted an employment certification form (ECF) between 2012 and 2016).
30
As of the third quarter of 2018, a total of 999,536 borrowers have had at least one employment
certification application approved. ECF REPORT (2018), supra note 29.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See Mark Krantrowitz, Very Few Borrowers Qualify for Public Service Loan Forgiveness,
FORBES (Sept. 20, 2018, 2:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markkantrowitz/2018/09/20/very-fewborrowers-qualify-for-public-service-loan-forgiveness/#286124782a6f (noting that only one percent of
applications for loan forgiveness have been approved as of June 30, 2018). This very low 1% approval
rate has continued through December 31, 2018. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program
Data, supra note 18.
35
See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
36
As of December 31, 2018, 53,749 borrowers had submitted loan forgiveness applications under
the PSLF program, and only 620 applications for loan forgiveness had been granted by that date,
approximately a 99% denial rate. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program Data, supra
note 18. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-547, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN
FORGIVENESS: EDUCATION NEEDS TO PROVIDE BETTER INFORMATION FOR THE LOAN SERVICER AND
BORROWERS 11 (2018). The most common reasons for the many denials were: (1) the borrower’s
employment or loans did not qualify; (2) the applicant had not made enough monthly payments; and (3)
the applications were incomplete. Id. These strikingly high denial rates were attributed largely to
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qualifying public service employment every year since late-2007 when the
PSLF program was first adopted—and who also have met the other program
requirements—were qualified at the time. But it is certain that the number
of people applying for debt forgiveness will grow rapidly as increasing
numbers of borrowers become more aware of the program’s generous debt
forgiveness provisions. Awareness will surely spread once it becomes
widely publicized that many people are taking advantage of those
provisions, and also as they begin to meet the ten-year public service
employment period requirement. It has been estimated that roughly onequarter of all jobs qualify as public service jobs under the PSLF program’s
broad definition,37 which is a strikingly high proportion. By the time the
borrower confusion regarding the program requirements. Id. at 11–12. It was estimated that the number
of loan forgiveness grants would rise to approximately 700 by September 30, 2018. Id. at 11. A
subsequent release by the Department of Education stated that as of December 31, 2018, 53,749
borrowers had submitted 65,500 applications for loan forgiveness under the PSLF program. Of the
58,293 applications that were processed, only 610 had been approved, and only 338 borrowers had had
their loans discharged, totaling $21.13 million in discharged debt. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness
(PSLF) Program Data, supra note 18.
In a recently approved $1.3 trillion spending bill, Congress authorized $350 million to expand the
PSLF program for people who met employment and loan requirements but failed to qualify for debt
forgiveness because they had chosen an ineligible loan repayment plan. Moriah Balingit & Danielle
Douglas-Gabriel, Congress Rejects Much of Betsy Devos’s Agenda in Spending Bill, WASH. POST (Mar.
24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2018/03/21/congress-rejects-much-ofbetsy-devoss-agenda-in-spending-bill/?utm_term=.94023c7aae21. In its fiscal year 2019 appropriations,
Congress added an additional $350 million to this program expansion, for a total of $700 million. Letter
from Senator Elizabeth Warren et al., to the Honorable Roy Blunt & Patty Murray (April 15, 2019),
available
at
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY20%20TEPSLF%20Request%20Letter.pdf.
The
precise criteria for qualifying for debt discharge under this new program are not yet clear. See Ron Lieber,
A Student Loan Fix, with Catches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2018, at B1 (“We’re still months away from
knowing the details of how the $350 million fund will work. And if you think you're repaying your debt
correctly under the many terms of the program, there's a decent chance you're not.”). In addition, that
$350 million sum is actually quite modest in this context; it would suffice to discharge only 7,000 debts
averaging $50,000 apiece, probably far from sufficient to provide relief for all those who inadvertently
chose (or were directed by their loan services to choose) an ineligible repayment plan. Id.
37
Delisle, supra note 4, at 3. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-663,
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION COULD DO MORE TO HELP ENSURE BORROWERS ARE AWARE
OF REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS OPTIONS 27 (Aug. 2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-663],
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672136.pdf (noting that an estimated 24.7% of U.S. workers (32.5
million out of 131.7 million workers nationwide) were in PSLF-qualifying public service jobs based on
2012 employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). The Government Accountability Office has
also estimated that as of June 2016, approximately 24% of all Direct Loan borrowers were enrolled in an
income-based loan repayment plan, and approximately 40% of all Direct Loan debts were being repaid
through such plans. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-22, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS:
EDUCATION NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLAN BUDGET ESTIMATES 8–9 (Nov.
2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681064.pdf [hereinafter GAO-17-22].
The statutory definition of “public service job” for the PSLF program is very broad. It includes all
full-time employment by any level of government, by a qualifying 501(c)(3) or 501(a) organization, or
by any of a number of public service activities done on a full-time basis for any employer, even if public
service is not the primary purpose of the employer:
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program roughly reaches a “steady state” in terms of the number of people
who seek debt forgiveness each year, this number could become quite
large—perhaps in the neighborhood of 200,000 people each year or more.38
(B) Public service job
The term “public service job” means—
(i) a full-time job in emergency management, government (excluding time served as
a member of Congress), military service, public safety, law enforcement, public health
(including nurses, nurse practitioners, nurses in a clinical setting, and full-time
professionals engaged in health care practitioner occupations and health care support
occupations, as such terms are defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), public
education, social work in a public child or family service agency, public interest law
services (including prosecution or public defense or legal advocacy on be- half of lowincome communities at a non-profit organization), early childhood education
(including licensed or regulated childcare, Head Start, and State funded
prekindergarten), public service for individuals with disabilities, public service for the
elderly, public library sciences, school-based library sciences and other school-based
services, or at an organization that is described in section 501(c)(3) of title 26 and
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such title; or
(ii) teaching as a full-time faculty member at a Tribal College or University as defined
in section 1059c(b) of this title and other faculty teaching in high-needs subject areas
or areas of shortage (including nurse faculty, foreign language faculty, and part-time
faculty at community colleges), as determined by the Secretary.
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B) (2018).
By regulation, the DOE has attempted to narrow PSLF program eligibility, but in a manner that is
arguably inconsistent with the statute and subject to challenge. See Gregory Crespi, The Public Service
Loan Forgiveness Program: The Need for Better Eligibility Regulations, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 833–43
(2018) (noting concerns that the regulations issued in 2008 by the DOE are “incomplete and in some
important ways inconsistent with the governing statute”).
38
There were approximately 31.9 million Direct Loan borrowers as of the first quarter of 2017.
Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, supra note 12. 7.66 million of them are enrolled in incomebased loan repayment plans. See GAO-17-22 supra note 37, at 8–9 (stating that 24% of Direct Loan
borrowers are enrolled in income-based loan repayment plans). Assuming, based on GAO statistics, that
24.7% of those 7.66 million borrowers work in qualifying public service positions, then 1.89 million
public service employees will likely have significant outstanding debt after ten years of employment and
will therefore seek PSLF forgiveness once eligible. See GAO-15-663 supra note 37, at 27 (explaining
that 24.7% of U.S. workers were employed in PSLF-qualifying public service jobs).
For the long-term steady-state, approximately 10% of those 1.89 million people will meet the tenyear employment requirement each year. These 189,000 people will be replaced in the PSLF program
“pipeline” by an approximately equal-size cohort of new employees also enrolled in income-based loan
repayment plans. But it seems likely that given the relatively modest salaries paid by most public service
positions, a significantly more than 24% of those Direct Loan borrowers who work in public service
positions will have enrolled in an income-based loan repayment plan, exceeding the overall average rate
of enrollment for Direct Loan borrowers. In addition, the proportion of Direct Loan borrowers enrolling
in income-based repayment plans has doubled in the past three years. See GAO-17-22 supra note 37, at
8–9 (“The percent of borrowers participating in [income-driven repayment] plans more than doubled
over the same time period to 24[%].”). This will likely continue to increase given rising student loan debt
and continuing relatively poor employment prospects. Therefore, it is very possible that the eventual
number of people seeking PSLF forgiveness each year might substantially exceed 200,000.
Based on the discussion above, approximately 76%—or 5.99 million—of Direct Loan borrowers
who work in public service have not enrolled in an income-based loan repayment plan. These people are
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Given that many of these people will have substantial amounts of debt
forgiven,39 in particular many law school graduates40 and medical school
graduates,41 the annual cost to the Treasury for this program could easily
grow to a multi-billion dollar sum,42 as I will demonstrate in Part III of this
Article.

likely to have, on average, smaller initial loan debts than those who have enrolled in an income-based
loan repayment plan since persons with smaller debts obtain less of an advantage from such incomebased repayment plans, sometimes much less, and are therefore less likely to enroll in such plans than
are high-debt persons, such as law school graduates, who often have six-figure debt loads and who will
benefit handsomely. The large majority of those who have not enrolled in an income-based plan
repayment plan will fully or almost fully repay their debts after ten years of public service employment
since ordinary repayment plans will require relatively large monthly payments that will be sufficient to
fully or almost fully amortize typical undergraduate loan debts, particularly given the somewhat lower
interest rates that apply to undergraduate loans as compared to graduate student loans. Therefore, it is
likely that they will either not seek PSLF forgiveness at all or will have only minimal debt remaining to
be forgiven.
39
Jason Delisle estimates that the median debt load of those who have obtained one or more PSLF
employment certification(s) is over $60,000, and that nearly thirty percent of have a debt load of over
$100,000. DELISLE, supra note 4, at 4. He also finds that eighty percent of borrowers who have obtained
one or more PSLF employment certifications have borrowed more than $30,000 and concludes that
“PSLF is really a de facto loan forgiveness program for graduate students . . . . [T]he program is
dominated by students who attended graduate and professional school.” Id. See also Barbara Hoblitzell
et al., Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Presentation at the 2015
FSA
Training
Conference
for
Financial
Aid
Professionals
(Dec.
2015),
https://fsaconferences.ed.gov/conferences/library/2015/2015FSAConfSession5.ppt (providing a stepby-step explanation of PSLF).
40
Many law students will graduate with well over $150,000 of combined law school and
undergraduate student loan debt. See Crespi (2016), supra note 25, at 154–55 n.110 (calculating the
average combined undergraduate and law school debt for a student who attended law school between
2011 and 2014 at approximately $160,000). For an extended discussion of the magnitude of law school
graduate debt loads, see generally Crespi (2017), supra note 25; Crespi (2016), supra note 25.
41
One might think that most doctors would earn substantial enough incomes during their first ten
years of medical practice that even payments of only ten percent of their discretionary income, as required
under the PAYE or IBR plans, would fully repay substantial medical school debts before qualifying for
debt forgiveness under the PSLF program. However, many doctors will spend four years in residency—
at a relatively low salary—at a hospital that qualifies as a public service employer, and then will serve
up to another three years in a similarly low-paying qualifying internship. See Farran Powell, Think About
Paying Your Loans During Medical Residency, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/paying/articles/2018-02-08/think-aboutpaying-student-loans-during-medical-residency (“While the earning potential is high among physicians,
the years spent in residency are oftentimes marked by low pay. . . . [A] medical resident is paid around
$51,000 a year on average.”). Even after several later years of making more substantial loan repayments
out of a larger income, doctors would often still have substantial amounts of debt remaining to be forgiven
under the program.
42
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that by capping the amount of debt that could be
forgiven under the PSLF program at $57,500 and eliminating the cap on required monthly repayments
to the amount owing under standard ten-year loan repayment terms—both recommended in 2014 by the
Obama Administration—the government would save $12.1 billion over the ten-year-period from 2015
to 2024. DELISLE, supra note 4, at 3. The savings would obviously be larger if the program were
eliminated altogether.
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Increasing public attention will surely be paid to the large taxpayer costs
of the program once significant numbers of people begin to apply for and
obtain forgiveness of six-figure debts that—in some instances—will exceed
$200,000. The Trump Administration’s 2017 proposal to prospectively
abolish the PSLF program43 was never adopted, and the very similar 2019
Administration proposal will likely fail to be adopted as well. But as the
major budgetary implications of forgiving this much debt become more
clear, other attempts will likely be made by Congress, the Trump
Administration, a later Administration, or all of them to statutorily limit
PSLF program eligibility or its generosity in a retroactive manner, or to
statutorily limit or eliminate the current exclusion of debt forgiven under this
program from taxation.
As greater public attention is paid to the PSLF program, there may also
be calls made for its elimination, or at least its curtailment or substantial
modification, based not upon its overall costs but instead upon the regressive
manner in which its benefits will be conferred. A typical undergraduate
borrower who leaves school with a $30,000 Direct Loan debt, takes a public
service job of the nature and compensation level usually available to a
person with only an undergraduate degree, and then enrolls in the popular
Pay As You Earn (“PAYE”) income-based loan repayment plan, will have
$25,000 of remaining debt to be forgiven after ten years of public service
employment.44 For such a borrower, the annualized value of the eventual
debt forgiveness is approximately equal to an additional $2,642 per year in
before-tax income for that ten-year period.45 This benefit provides a
43
See TRUMP PROPOSED BUDGET 2017, supra note 3, at 20 (proposing to abolish the PSLF
program).
44
Consider a person who graduates from an undergraduate program under the following typical
circumstances: $30,000 of Direct Loan debt; a 5% annual interest rate; a spouse and child; a qualifying
public service position with a $45,000 starting salary; and enrollment in the PAYE loan repayment plan.
The plan will require the borrower to make annual repayments of only 10% of the difference between
adjusted gross income and 150% of the poverty-level wage. Crespi (2014), supra note 26, at 79. The
borrower’s annual payment obligation would be approximately $1,500. This would be just enough to
meet the annual interest payments of $1,500. In succeeding years, with modest annual raises and
corresponding increases in annual payment obligations under the PAYE plan, the borrower would begin
to amortize principal debt, but only by a few hundred dollars per year. After ten years, the borrower
would still have $25,000 or so of debt to be forgiven.
For an extended discussion of the financial details of the various federal income-based loan
repayment plans and the tax consequences for borrowers of utilizing one of those plans without obtaining
PSLF forgiveness, see Crespi (2014), supra note 26, 85–101 (detailing a hypothetical borrower’s loan
repayment under the IBR program). For further discussion of the taxation issues raised by these incomebased loan repayment programs and discussion of the impacts of the Revised Pay As You Earn
(“REPAYE”) plan—the newest addition to the menu of subsidized loan repayment options—upon law
school graduates, see Crespi (2017), supra note 25, at 337–49 (exploring why the REPAYE plan will
have a limited impact on law school graduates); Crespi (2016), supra note 25, at 137–85 (addressing the
impact of the tax bomb on lawyers).
45
The annual benefit of $25,000 in forgiven debt after ten years over a ten-year period at a 5%
annual discount rate, is $1,987 per year. Assuming that the typical public service worker is in a 25%
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relatively modest inducement to enter public service—approximately an
additional six percent each year for ten years—which is over and above the
average initial public service compensation for persons with only
undergraduate degrees.46
In sharp contrast, a typical law school graduate who leaves school with
a now-common combined undergraduate and law school Direct Loan debt
of $150,000,47 enrolls in the PAYE plan, and takes a public service position
of the sort and compensation level open to recent law school graduates, will
experience pronounced negative amortization of his loan debt during the
next ten years. It is likely that this type of graduate will have $200,000 of
debt or more forgiven, almost an order of magnitude more than the typical
undergraduate borrower. 48 Having $200,000 of debt forgiven after ten years
is approximately equivalent to receiving an additional $21,142 per year in
before-tax income each year for that ten-year period,49 providing a much
stronger inducement to enter public service. This is approximately
equivalent to a thirty-eight percent raise each year over ten years, over and
above the average initial public service compensation for law graduates each
year.50 A typical medical school graduate who also graduates with a
$150,000 loan debt, and who—as is common—spends the next seven years
in modestly paid residencies and internships before taking a public service
combined marginal federal and state income tax bracket, this would be $2,642 per year in additional
before-tax income.
46
$2642 / $45,000 = 58.7%. See supra notes 44, 45 (estimating a $45,000 starting salary for a
qualifying public service position and calculating an additional before-tax savings of $2,642 for a person
graduating from an undergraduate program).
47
See supra note 40 (discussing the average amount of debt for undergraduate and law students).
48
Consider a person who graduates from law school under the following typical circumstances: a
combined undergraduate and law school Direct Loan debt load of $150,000; a typical 6% annual interest
rate, reflecting the higher rate charged to graduate school borrowers; a spouse and child; a qualifying
public service position as an attorney with a $55,000 starting salary; enrollment in the PAYE loan
repayment plan. Under PAYE, the borrower will be required to make annual repayments of only 10% of
the difference between adjusted gross income and 150% of the poverty-level wage. Crespi (2014), supra
note 26, at 79. The borrower’s annual payment obligation would be approximately $2,500 per year. This
would be far short of the amount needed—just enough to meet the annual interest payments on their loan
debt of $9,000. Their debt would therefore increase by $6,500 during the first year. In succeeding years,
with modest annual raises and corresponding increases in annual payment obligations under the PAYE
plan, the amount of accruing unpaid interest would gradually reduce, but the negative amortization would
likely persist for the entire ten-year period, leading to a total principal plus accrued interest debt of over
$200,000 at the time of debt forgiveness.
49
Two-hundred thousand dollars of forgiven debt is eight times as large as the $25,000 of forgiven
debt for a typical undergraduate borrower. See supra text accompanying note 44 (calculating the typical
forgiveness for an undergraduate student utilizing PSLF). If one annualizes the benefits of $200,000 in
forgiven debt after ten years over a ten-year period at a 5% annual discount rate, this comes to $15,896
per year. Assuming that the typical legal public service worker is also in a 25% combined marginal
federal and state income tax bracket, this would be $21,142 per year in additional before-tax income.
50
$21,142 / $55,000 = 38.44%. See supra notes 48, 49 (estimating a $55,000 starting salary for a
qualifying public service position and calculating an additional before-tax savings of $21,142 for a person
graduating from law school).
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position as a fully licensed doctor, will also experience pronounced negative
amortization for most of the ten years of public service, and will have on the
order of $200,000 of debt forgiven.51 This is, again, a benefit roughly equal
to $21,142 per year in additional before-tax compensation each year for ten
years. The PSLF program has already come under harsh criticism for this
regressive distributional feature and for distorting borrower incentives to
favor high-cost graduate programs, even though very few such debts have
been yet forgiven.52
The PSLF program could, without question, be prospectively limited or
even terminated by statute with regard to those persons who have not yet
taken out any Direct Loans at the time of legislative amendment, as the
Trump Administration proposed in 2017 and again in 2019.53 Those persons
who have not yet executed any Direct Loan contracts at the time of a
statutory amendment that curtailed PSLF program rights would clearly not
be able to utilize the program to obtain forgiveness of later Direct Loan
obligations beyond what forgiveness was permitted by that amendment, if at
all. Nor would those persons who had previously taken out Direct Loans
have a right to insist upon taking advantage of the pre-amendment PSLF
program terms for any new Direct Loans that they may take out after such
an amendment.

51

This medical school graduate with similar initial debt and family circumstances will be in
essentially the same position as the law school graduate discussed above, see supra text accompanying
note 39 (discussing the average median debt load of people who have obtained PSLF program
employment certifications), except that the doctor would be likely to receive a substantial salary increase
after completing an internship for the last three years of a ten-year public service period. This might even
be enough to repay some of the accrued interest from the seven years of pronounced negative
amortization. See discussion supra note 41.
52
Jason Delisle argues that the fact that the PSLF program will disproportionately benefit high-debt
graduate school borrowers will not only be improperly regressive in its incidence, but will also distort
incentives to attend graduate school and encourage graduate schools to raise their tuitions. DELISLE,
supra note 4, at 6–7. There has also been criticism of law schools encouraging their students to utilize
the PSLF program as an indirect means of making those students less resistant to tuition increases. See
Travis Hornsby, Georgetown Law School PSLF Abuse Shows Why Program Will End, STUDENT LOAN
PLANNER (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.studentloanplanner.com/georgetown-law-school-pslf-abuse/
(arguing that PSLF became the largest back door grant program to American graduate schools in history).
On the other hand, law school graduates and doctors who enter public service rather than the private
sector will, on average, make much larger financial sacrifices than those who enter public service with
only undergraduate degrees, both in absolute dollar terms and in terms of the proportion of their
alternative private sector salary forgone. Given this fact, a significantly larger financial inducement may
be necessary to adequately encourage lawyers and doctors to enter public service than to induce persons
with only undergraduate degrees to do so. This need for providing a stronger financial inducement for
those with more attractive financial alternatives to public service may justify the regressivity and
distorted incentives of the way that the debt forgiveness benefits of the PSLF program are allocated.
There is room for reasonable disagreement here.
53
See TRUMP PROPOSED BUDGET 2017, supra note 3, at 20 (proposing to abolish the PSLF
program); TRUMP PROPOSED BUDGET 2019, supra note 23 (same).
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The more difficult question is whether such statutory limitations,
abolition, or tax changes could be retroactively imposed upon those who
have not yet filed an application for PSLF forgiveness but have completed
ten years of qualifying public service employment and executed loan
documentation prior to the effective date of the new legislation.54
Answering this question will require two difficult determinations. First,
do Direct Loan borrowers have contractual rights under their loan
agreements to utilize the current PSLF program terms and favorable tax
treatment of that forgiven debt for the loans they have taken out prior to any
legislation that would change those terms? Second, if they do have those
contractual rights to debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment, is the
federal government constitutionally permitted to retroactively abrogate
those contractual rights through legislative amendments without providing
compensation to those borrowers?
As to the first question, I will consider several related legal theories. One
or more of these theories may support a claim by some who have taken out
a Direct Loan to finance their education before the effective date of new
legislation altering the PSLF program or favorable tax treatment. Such
claimants might suggest that they have a contractual right to debt forgiveness
in accordance with the PSLF program terms and perhaps also a contractual
right to invoke the tax laws that were in force at the time that they took out
their loan (at least those Direct Loans taken out prior to the effective date of
new legislation). As to the second question, assuming for the sake of
argument that the Direct Loan agreements do establish one or both of these
borrower contractual rights under one or more legal theories, I will then
consider whether the federal government has the power to legislatively
abrogate one or both of those contractual rights without providing
compensation.
The central loan document executed by borrowers under the federal
Direct Loan program is titled “Master Promissory Note, Direct Subsidized
Loans and Direct Unsubsidized Loans, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program” (“MPN”).55 That document provides the basis for each of four
54
An even more difficult question is posed by Direct Loans taken out after 1994 and before October
1, 2007. Those Direct Loans may be forgiven under the terms of the PSLF program, but there is no
reference to the PSLF program in the MPN that was executed for those loans since the program had not
yet been enacted. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB No. 1845-0068, APPLICATION AND MASTER
PROMISSORY NOTE: FEDERAL DIRECT PLUS LOAN WILLIAM D. FORD FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN
PROGRAM, https://ifap.ed.gov/dlbulletins/attachments/DLB0307B.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2018)
(illustrating that an MPN expiring in 2005 made no reference to PSLF). Whether these loans would
provide borrowers with contractual protection against subsequent legislation curtailing PSLF rights to
the same extent as would post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loans that reference the PSLF program is a hard
question to answer; I suspect that they would not do so.
55
The current MPN expires on April 30, 2019. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB NO. 1845-0007,
MASTER PROMISSORY NOTE, DIRECT SUBSIDIZED LOANS AND DIRECT UNSUBSIDIZED LOANS, WILLIAM
D. FORD FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM 1 (Oct. 21, 2018) [hereinafter MPN (2018)],
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separate legal theories that I will consider as to why a borrower’s execution
of the document creates a contractual obligation for the government to
provide the borrower with current PSLF rights and perhaps also the vested
right to current tax law treatment.
The first legal theory that I will consider will be that the federal
government, by making a Direct Loan to a borrower using loan
documentation that refers to the PSLF program in the way that the MPN
used since October 1, 2007, expressly provides borrowers with a contractual
right to utilize the existing PSLF program terms and beneficial tax laws.56
This argument may continue to be asserted even if the PSLF program or tax
laws are legislatively altered and the loan documentation accordingly
revised with regard to future Direct Loans.
The second and related theory that I will consider is that even if the MPN
is interpreted to not expressly provide borrowers with the aforementioned
contractual rights, under accepted contract law principles, borrowers still
have an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the government
on their loan contracts. This implied covenant arguably protects borrowers’
reasonable expectations to be able to invoke those PSLF terms and tax
benefits in effect when they took out their loans.
The third argument that I will examine is that even if these borrowers
have neither express contractual rights nor an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, they nevertheless can enforce their rights to favorable debt
forgiveness and tax terms under the promissory estoppel theory of
contractual liability based upon foreseeable reliance on the terms of their
loan agreements.
Finally, I will consider the argument that if the three prior arguments
fail, MPN terms that would allow unilateral imposition of harsher repayment
terms or less favorable tax treatment are unconscionable and should
therefore be excised from the loan agreements.
Having examined these potential arguments, I will then consider the
government’s arguments of why the government should be constitutionally
permitted to retroactively abolish the PSLF program or tax benefits—even
if borrowers are determined to have these contractual rights and especially
if they do not.
This Article focuses solely upon the circumstances of Direct Loan
borrowers with regard to subsequent statutory amendments that purport to
retroactively curtail their PSLF program privileges or the tax law treatment
of debt so forgiven. I will not consider in this Article possible attempts by
the DOE to impose tighter limits on PSLF eligibility by adopting more
restrictive new regulations that would narrow the scope of eligible public
https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/downloadPDF.action?fileName=SUB_UNSUB_MPN
[https://perma.cc/AYA5-TMY2].
56
See I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (2012) (excluding from the definition of gross income student loans
discharged by reason of the student working for a certain period of time in certain professions).
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service employment under the existing statutes rather than by statutory
amendment. I will also not consider the possible DOE actions that would
attempt to limit program eligibility through embracing a more restrictive
interpretation of the current eligibility regulations. Obama Administration
DOE actions of this latter nature from 2016 are being challenged in court by
the American Bar Association.57 I examine the merits of these challenges in
a separate article.58
Let me provide the reader with a road map to the remainder of this
Article. Part I presents the text of the relevant PSLF-program-related
language that has been included since October 1, 2007 in the MPN for Direct
Loan transactions. Part II explains why it is not yet possible to confidently
offer precise estimates of the individual and aggregate amounts of loan debt
that may possibly be forgiven under this program over the coming decades.
However, a realistic hypothetical calculation based on the best data available
will strongly suggest that the amount of debt forgiven under the PSLF
program will eventually grow to at least $12 billion per year, and perhaps to
as much as $18 billion per year, thus imposing substantial costs upon
taxpayers. I will then discuss in Part III each of the contractual theories noted
above that could be invoked by Direct Loan borrowers on the basis of the
current MPN language and various theories of contractual liability. These
arguments attempt to establish that students have a contractual right to later
utilize current PSLF program terms and favorable tax treatment.
Part IV first considers the legality of retroactive abolition of the PSLF
program and tax benefits, assuming Direct Loan borrowers are held to not
have contractual rights to those favorable terms. I will then consider the legal
consequences under the assumption that Direct Loan borrowers do have
such contractual rights under one or another of the theories I have set forth.
57
The current DOE PSLF regulations broadly define which organizations will qualify as “public
service organizations” whose employees may qualify for PSLF program debt forgiveness. 34 C.F.R. §
685.219(b) (2018). However, despite previously certifying for several prospective program applicants
that their employment by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) would qualify as employment by a
public service organization, the DOE under the Obama Administration (through FedLoan Servicing, an
organization to whom the DOE has delegated PSLF program administrative responsibilities) later took
the position that ABA employment will not qualify. Crespi, supra note 37, at 843. The DOE has since
been sued by the ABA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in an attempt to reverse this
ruling. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 16-cv-02476 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2016), 2016 WL 7634495. The DOE has taken a similar position
regarding employment with both the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Immigration
Lawyers Association, despite having previously certified both as qualifying for the PSLF program.
Stephanie Francis Ward, Did Government Reverse Position on Qualifications for Public Service Loan
J.
(June
16,
2016,
2:26
PM)
Forgiveness
Program?,
ABA
www.abajournal.com/news/article/did_doe_reverse_position_on_qualifications_for_public_service_loa
n-forgiven. That lawsuit was recently resolved, with several, but not all, of the plaintiffs prevailing
against the DOE. Am. Bar Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Educ., No. CV 16-2476 (TJK), 2019 WL
2211208 (D.D.C. May 22, 2019).
58
See generally Crespi, supra note 37.

646

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:3

I will here assess the arguments that can be offered for and against the
constitutionality of the federal government retroactively abrogating these
contractual rights without providing compensation to affected borrowers.
The final part of the Article will present my overall conclusions.
Let me briefly summarize these conclusions. First, as a matter of
positive law, I believe that the express language of the MPN is most
reasonably read as not creating contractual rights—neither for Direct Loan
borrowers to later avail themselves of the current PSLF program privileges,
nor to receive the current favorable tax treatment.59 That being said,
however, the argument that those borrowers have such contractual rights on
the basis of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is very
plausible—at least for those borrowers who can demonstrate that they had a
reasonable expectation at the time they took out their loan that they would
have such rights.60 In addition, the related but distinct argument that the
government should be contractually bound by promissory estoppel
principles to honor those debt forgiveness and tax treatment rights also has
some force, again at least with regard to those borrowers who can
demonstrate that they actually relied upon later having those rights at the
time they entered into their loan agreements or when they later accepted
public service employment. However, there are some strong counterarguments against the application of promissory estoppel principles to create
such contractual rights.61 Finally, a robust unconscionability challenge can
be mounted against enforcement of those MPN terms that make this debt
forgiveness and favorable tax treatment only a privilege rather than a
contractual right by subjecting those privileges to retroactive alteration—at
least with regard to those high-debt borrowers who were unaware of or who
did not understand this conditional language and who would be severely
impacted by the loss or substantial curtailment of their debt forgiveness
rights or their favorable tax treatment.62
Assuming Direct Loan borrowers do not have these two contractual
rights, then the government would be permitted to retroactively abolish the
PSLF program, mooting the issue of retroactively abolishing the tax
exemption.63 If one assumes for the sake of argument, however, that
borrowers do have these contractual rights, the rights should be regarded as
59

See infra Part III(A) (suggesting that the express terms of the MPN do not preclude statutory
amendments that could limit or eliminate PSLF debt forgiveness or the tax exemption for forgiven debt).
60
See infra Part III(B) (noting that a court may ask a litigant to prove that he or she had a reasonable
expectation of having contractual rights to debt forgiveness).
61
See infra Part III(C) (explaining the promissory estoppel rationale and introducing the counterarguments to using the promissory estoppel rationale).
62
See infra Part III(D) (explaining the argument that contractual alterations here could be
procedurally and substantively unconscionable).
63
Which I believe would also then be permitted, although there are substantive due process
concerns. See infra Part IV (introducing the due process issues).
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“property” protected by the Takings Clause of the Constitution against
statutory curtailment or elimination without payment of compensation
raising some issues for the legality of abolishing the tax exemption.64
As a matter of policy, while I recognize that there is a sharp tension
between the expectations of many current borrowers employed in public
service to obtain debt forgiveness with favorable tax treatment, as against
legitimate public concerns for the program’s excessive costs and regressive
benefits,65 I do not have strong feelings or special insights as to how this
tension should be resolved. I would suggest for discussion one compromise
resolution; continuing the program’s debt forgiveness benefits but adopting
a statute which treats debt forgiven under the PSLF program as taxable
income, as is now done for the other federal income-based loan repayment
programs. There are, of course, other resolutions possible that might better
balance these interests. The sooner these questions are resolved, the better
for all concerned.
I. THE DIRECT LOAN MASTER PROMISSORY NOTE
The following six provisions of the current MPN document used for
making Direct Loans each explicitly or implicitly refer to the PSLF program.
They are thus relevant to whether, by executing the MPN, a borrower
secures contractual rights to debt forgiveness and tax exemption under
current terms and law.66
(1) GOVERNING LAW
The terms of this Master Promissory Note (MPN) will be
interpreted in accordance with the HEA (20 U.S.C. 1070 et
seq.), ED’s regulations, any amendments to the HEA and the
regulations in accordance with the effective date of those
amendments, and other applicable federal laws and
regulations. Throughout this MPN, we refer to these laws and
regulations collectively as the “Act[.]”67
(2) REPAYMENT

64
See infra Part IV (expanding the argument that contractual rights should be regarded as property
and protected under the Takings Clause).
65
See infra Conclusion (noting the difficulty with balancing Direct Loan borrower’s reliance on the
PSLF program with the public concern regarding the cost and regressive effect of the program).
66
I have included the selective use of large bold font that is utilized by the Master Promissory Note.
67
MPN (2018), supra note 55, at 3. The MPN includes multiple abbreviations, including “HEA”
for the Higher Education Act of 1965 and “ED” for the Department of Education.
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You must repay the full amount of the loans made under this
MPN, plus accrued interest.68
(3) William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program
Direct Subsidized Loan and Direct Unsubsidized Loan
Borrower's Rights and Responsibilities Statement

IMPORTANT NOTICE
This Borrower's Rights and Responsibilities Statement
provides additional information about the terms and
conditions of the loans you receive under the accompanying
Master Promissory Note (MPN) for Direct Subsidized Loans
and Direct Unsubsidized Loans.69
(4) LAWS THAT APPLY TO THIS MPN
The terms and conditions of loans made under this MPN are
determined by the HEA and other applicable federal laws and
regulations. These laws and regulations are referred to as “the
Act” throughout this Borrower’s Rights and Responsibilities
Statement . . . .
NOTE: Any amendment to the Act that affects the terms of
this MPN will be applied to your loans in accordance with the
effective date of the amendment.70
(5) DISCHARGE (HAVING YOUR LOAN FORGIVEN)
....
Public Service Loan Forgiveness
A Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program is also
available. Under this program, we will forgive the remaining
balance due on your eligible Direct Loan Program loans after
you have made 120 payments on those loans (after October 1,
2007) under certain repayment plans while you are employed
full-time in certain public service jobs. The required 120
payments do not have to be consecutive. Qualifying
68

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
70
Id.
69
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repayment plans include the REPAYE Plan, the PAYE Plan,
the IBR Plan, the ICR Plan, and the Standard Repayment Plan
with a 10-year repayment period.71
(6) PROMISE TO PAY
....
By signing this MPN, you . . . agree to repay in full all loans
made under this MPN according to the terms and conditions
of the MPN.72
_________________________
The MPN makes no reference to Section 108 of the IRS Code, which
provides an exemption from inclusion in taxable income for student loan
debt that is forgiven under the PSLF program.73
II. THE AMOUNT OF DEBT LIKELY TO BE FORGIVEN UNDER THE PSLF
PROGRAM
The data is, unfortunately, currently inadequate to offer precise
estimates of how many people will take advantage of the generous PSLF
provisions in the coming tax years. Before the program was first established
in 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that, if the thenproposed PSLF legislation was adopted, “approximately 50,000 new
borrowers each year would eventually be eligible for, and participate in,
income-contingent loan forgiveness” under this program.74 But this early,
pre-enactment estimate was little more than a guess, and it will likely prove
to be a significant underestimate. A million borrowers have obtained annual
employment certifications as of the end of the third quarter of 2018,75 with
197,496 new borrowers doing so during the first nine months of 2018 alone76
even though such certifications are not required.77 It has been estimated that
71

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
73
See I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (2012) (excluding from the definition of gross income student loans
discharged by reason of the student working for a certain period of time in public service professions).
74
H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 72 (2007).
75
As of the end of the third quarter of 2018, a total of 999,536 borrowers have had at least one
employment certification application approved. ECF REPORT (2018), supra note 29.
76
See id.
77
DELISLE, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that the certification process is optional). Of these
certifications, approximately 62% of the applicants were employed by a governmental body and 38% by
a qualifying Section 501(c)(3) organization. Hoblitzell et al., supra note 39, at 23. Approximately 70%
of the applications for certification were granted, and the remainder were denied either because the
72
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as many as one-quarter of the jobs in the economy qualify as public service
jobs under the program’s broad definition.78
The data is also inadequate to precisely estimate the average amount and
range of the debts that will be forgiven each year. The Congressional Budget
Office annual participation estimate noted above did not include any
estimates of the aggregate amount of debt that would be forgiven each year.79
Many PSLF participants will have only modest undergraduate debt and no
graduate school debt,80 and thus they will likely have relatively small
amounts of debt left to be forgiven. But according to estimates, because of
substantial participation by high-debt graduate school borrowers, the median
debt load of participants at the time of debt forgiveness could be over
$60,000, with nearly 30% of participants having debt loads of over
$100,000.81 In addition, 2014 data revealed that 80% of Direct Loan
borrowers who had received one or more annual PSLF employment
certifications had debts of over $30,000, compared to only 36% of all Direct
Loan borrowers.82
Many law school and medical school graduates leave school with sixfigure combined graduate and undergraduate student debt loads,83 and those
lawyers and doctors who take public service jobs paying relatively modest
salaries often will experience significant negative amortization of these
debts over the following decade. The monthly loan repayments that they will
have to make under either the PAYE plan or the post-2014 version of the
Income-Based Repayment plan—one of which is usually selected by
persons in this position—will be based in size upon their relatively modest
salaries and will normally not be sufficient to cover even the interest owing
on those large loan debts.84 This will lead to negative amortization and rapid
growth of their unpaid debt. Many will consequently have accumulated debt
of upwards of $200,000 or more85 to be forgiven after ten years of qualifying
employment. The forgiveness of these numerous large individual loan debts

employer did not qualify, the loans involved were not eligible for forgiveness, or there was missing or
incorrect information on the application. Id. at 24–25.
78
See GAO-15-663, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing how an estimated 24.7% of U.S. workers were
employed in PSLF-qualifying public service jobs based on 2012 employment data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
79
H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 71–72 (2007).
80
See DELISLE, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that dependent undergraduate borrowers are only
permitted to borrow $31,000 over five years of education, and independent borrowers are permitted to
borrow $57,500).
81
Id. (drawing on Hoblitzell et al., supra note 39, at 28).
82
GAO-15-663, supra note 37, at 30–31.
83
See Crespi (2016), supra note 25, at 154–55 n.110 (calculating that the average law school debt
from 2011 to 2014 would be approximately $160,000).
84
See id. at 123–24 (explaining how payments are calculated under each plan).
85
Id. at 163.
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could easily impose a substantial annual cost upon the U.S. Treasury in the
billions of dollars.86
Precisely how many billions of dollars per year in costs to taxpayers is
unclear, but a few things are certain: at least 24.9 million, and perhaps as
many as 31.9 million, borrowers have taken out Direct Loans since October
1, 2007, incorporating the current MPN provisions set forth above that relate
in some fashion to the PSLF program;87 a million of these borrowers have
filed at least one of the voluntary PSLF program employment certification
forms with the DOE;88 and roughly one-quarter of all jobs will qualify as
public service jobs.89 But since there is no requirement that people register
for the PSLF program prior to eventually filing for debt forgiveness when
they become eligible to do so, there is no solid basis for forecasting how
many borrowers will eventually apply, nor how large the aggregate amount
of debt forgiven will likely be. But given: (1) how attractive the debt
forgiveness terms of the PSLF program are, particularly for high-debt
graduate school borrowers; (2) how broadly public service employment is
defined for PSLF program purposes; and (3) the fairly large and rapidly
increasing number of annual employment certification forms that have been
filed to date, the amount of debt forgiven each year under this program will
eventually become quite substantial,90 likely large enough to lead to political
efforts to limit or even end the PSLF program.91
To make these impending financial consequences for taxpayers clearer,
consider the following illustrative, realistic hypothetical calculation. In
2015, 143,276 new borrowers first received annual employment
certifications from the DOE, and in 2016, a total of 218,223 new borrowers
first received annual employment certifications.92 In 2014, the number of

86

DELISLE, supra note 4, at 3.
Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, supra note 12 (illustrating that between the end of 2007
and 2017, 26 million Direct Loan borrowers had taken out their loans, and seven million additional Direct
Loan borrowers had outstanding loans as of fiscal year 2007). In addition, as of 2011, there were 23.8
million persons with outstanding FFELP loans under that loan program, which was discontinued in 2010,
and 2.9 million persons with outstanding Perkins loans. Id. Some significant proportion of these
borrowers have or will later consolidate those loans into Direct Loans eligible for PSLF program debt
forgiveness. For a more thorough discussion regarding the eligibility of FFELP loans and Perkins loans
for PSLF, see supra note 12.
88
See ECF REPORT (2018), supra note 29 (noting that as of the fourth quarter of 2018, a total of
999,536 borrowers have had at least one employment certification application approved).
89
See GAO-15-663, supra note 37, at 27 (observing that an estimated 24.7% of U.S. workers were
employed in PSLF-qualifying public service jobs based on 2012 employment data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
90
See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial student loan debts
associated with legal and medical education).
91
See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text (explaining that the Trump Administration already
attempted to impose limitations on the PSLF program with its 2017 budget proposal).
92
Supra notes 31–32.
87
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Direct Loan borrowers increased by 2.3 million; in 2015, by 2 million;94
and in 2016, by 1.6 million.95 These figures together suggest that upwards
of a couple of hundred thousand people each year, or more, may now be
entering the PSLF program loan forgiveness ten-year “pipeline.”96 Another
important statistic to consider is that approximately 1.31 million97 Direct
Loan borrowers currently work in public service positions and have enrolled
in an income-based loan repayment plan, making them likely to have some
unpaid loan debt after ten years of public service. One would expect that on
average about 10% of these 1.31 million persons will reach the ten-year
PSLF employment requirement each year over the next decade, an average
of approximately 131,000 people each year, with, as I have noted,
approximately 200,000 or more newly hired public service employees now
entering the ten-year “pipeline” each year and working towards eventual
debt forgiveness eligibility.
I will (rather conservatively, I believe) project for the sake of this
numerical illustration that the eventual “steady-state” number of persons
who will seek debt forgiveness each year under the PSLF program will
stabilize at approximately 200,000.98 I base my projection on the data
regarding the number of new Direct Loan borrowers each year, the revealed
extent of PSLF program interest through filings for annual employment
certification, and the number of existing Direct Loan borrowers who both
are public service employees and are enrolled in income-based loan
repayment programs.
How much debt will be forgiven if this many people obtain forgiveness
each year? The median amount of Direct Loan debt for persons who will
later seek debt forgiveness under the PSLF program has been estimated at

93
See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID PORTFOLIO SUMMARY
(2018), http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio (last visited Oct. 1, 2018)
(presenting the number of Direct Loan borrowers from 2013–2018).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
These recent figures, showing that the number of persons filing for annual employment
certifications by 2016 is more than 10% of the number of annual new Direct Loan borrowers, suggest
that the proportion of the approximately one-quarter of Direct Loan borrowers who will take public
service positions—and eventually seek PSLF program loan forgiveness—is now in the neighborhood of
40%.
97
As of the third quarter of 2016, approximately 21.8 million people were repaying Direct Loans,
and approximately 24%—5.23 million people—were enrolled in income-based repayment plans. GAO
17-22, supra note 37, at 9. Assuming, conservatively, that approximately 25% of those persons were
employed in public service jobs, that amounts to 1.31 million people.
98
Given: (1) that prior employment certifications are not required for debt forgiveness eligibility;
(2) an estimated one-quarter of all employment would qualify for the PSLF program; and (3) the rapidly
rising proportion of Direct Loan borrowers enrolling in income-based loan repayment plans, this 200,000
number may well be a conservative under-estimate of the number of people who will annually seek debt
forgiveness. DELISLE, supra note 4, at 3.
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slightly over $60,000. I will assume for this simple illustration that the
average amount of Direct Loan debt owed by these persons upon their
enrollment in one or another of the loan repayment plans is equal to this
median debt estimate.100 Most of those persons will have spent the next ten
years after leaving school enrolled in either the PAYE plan or the post-2014
version of the Income-Based Repayment plan. Under either plan, they will
only have had to make loan repayments equal to 10% of their disposable
income,101 and given that the annual income for most persons working in
qualifying public service jobs will be relatively modest, those loan
repayments will on average barely be large enough to cover the annual loan
interest charges,102 if that, leaving on average the entire debt principal unpaid
at the time debt forgiveness is sought. Two-hundred thousand people per
year with an average of $60,000 each of loan debt forgiven,103 without tax
consequences, comes to $12 billion per year of forgiven debt— a substantial
cost to the Treasury.
This estimate of the annual steady-state PSLF program costs to the
Treasury, strikingly large as it is, may well be too conservative. With two
million new borrowers each year, 104 one-quarter of all jobs qualifying for the
program,105 and rapidly increasing enrollment in income-based loan

99

See id. at 4.
Given that there is a “long right tail” of law school or medical school Direct Loan borrowers
with very large loan debts, the average amount of initial loan debt owed by persons who will eventually
obtain PSLF forgiveness may well exceed the estimated median debt load of $60,000. See id. (depicting
graphically the long right tail of loan balances and explaining that it is because “the program is dominated
by students who attended graduate and professional school”).
101
Consider, for example, a Direct Loan borrower with a spouse and child who takes a $60,000
initial loan debt at a typical average annual interest rate of 6% and a public service position starting at a
$50,000 salary. Under the PAYE plan that person would have to make annual loan repayments of 10%
of their disposable income, approximately $3,000. This would be somewhat less than $3,600 annual
interest charge on their loan, leading to a $600 annual increase in their debt. With modest annual salary
increases, loan repayments would correspondingly increase, gradually allowing the borrower to be able
to slightly amortize the debt. After ten years, the remaining debt would likely be quite close to the initial
debt. For a high-debt law school or medical school borrower, however, there would be substantial
negative amortization throughout most or all of the ten-year period, leading to a forgiven debt well in
excess of the original substantial loan amount.
102
A person who is under the PAYE plan paying only 10% of the disposable income portion of, for
instance, a typical $50,000–$60,000 public interest salary would at best barely be able to cover the
interest payments on the median $60,000 debt load. See Sam Halpert, New Public Service Attorney Salary
Figures from NALP Show Slow Growth Since 2004, NALP: PUBLIC INTEREST SALARIES (July 9, 2018),
https://www.nalp.org/publicsectorsalaries (discussing average salaries for public sector attorneys based
on a nationwide survey).
103
Supra note 100; see also DELISLE, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining how the PSLF program has
borrowers with “some of the highest loan balances in the federal student loan program”).
104
See supra note 38 (calculating that there will be approximately 1.89 million Direct Loan
Borrowers under PSLF each year); GAO-17-22, supra note 37, at 1 (explaining the plan to add two
million new borrowers).
105
DELISLE, supra note 4, at 3.
100
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repayment plans, the long-run steady-state rate of participation in this
program could significantly exceed 200,000 persons per year leading to even
higher costs for taxpayers, particularly once the program’s benefits become
more widely bestowed and publicized. If, for example, 15% of each year’s
approximately two million Direct Loan borrowers later utilize the program
(still significantly less than the approximately 25% of jobs which qualify as
public service jobs),107 that would lead to approximately 300,000 persons
per year seeking debt forgiveness, at a total annual cost of approximately
$18 billion.
I am certain that annual costs of $12 billion to $18 billion will lead to
political efforts to statutorily curtail or eliminate the PSLF program,
probably resulting in broad support for retroactive changes impacting both
existing and future borrowers, if this can be legally justified. These efforts
will be bolstered by the support of those persons who are primarily
concerned by the highly regressive nature of the program’s benefits in favor
of high-debt law school and medical school graduates with above-average
incomes that I have noted. Let me now turn to the legality of the retroactive
application of such statutes, were they to be adopted.
III. BORROWER CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS TO INVOKE DEBT FORGIVENESS
The United States government is subject to the same obligation to
perform its contractual obligations as are private parties, except in those few
instances where special sovereign immunity defenses apply.108 Such
defenses do not apply to ordinary student loan transactions.109 The issue here
is therefore whether the MPN documentation that is now used for Direct
Loan transactions contractually obligates the government to provide
borrowers with those PSLF program debt forgiveness provisions and the
related tax laws that existed when the contracts were entered into, and if so,
whether these borrower contractual rights are constitutionally protected
from being abrogated by later-enacted changes in those laws.
Let me consider separately each of four different rationales that can be
offered in support of the argument that Direct Loan borrowers who took out
their loans after October 1, 2007 and prior to the effective date of any
legislative changes affecting the PSLF program or related tax laws have a
contractual right both to invoke the program’s terms and related tax laws in
force at the time that they took out their loans. These four arguments are
based on: (1) the express terms of the MPN; (2) the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; (3) promissory estoppel and the borrower’s
foreseeable reliance on later being able to invoke the PSLF program’s terms
106

Id.
Id.
108
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935) (citing Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719
(1878)).
109
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012) (listing sovereign immunity defense exceptions).
107
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and related tax benefits; and (4) unconscionability of MPN terms that would
retroactively subject borrowers to later-enacted legislative changes in the
program. In Part V, I will start with the assumption that these contractual
rights can be established under one or more of these theories, and I will then
turn to consider whether the federal government could legally adopt statutes
abrogating one or both of these rights without being subject to constitutional
limitations that would either bar such actions or require it to provide
compensation to those borrowers.
A. The Express Contractual Terms Argument
The MPN clearly states the terms of the debt forgiveness rights that
borrowers currently have under the PSLF program.110 However, the MPN
also appears to incorporate by reference later-enacted laws that could
retroactively curtail or even eliminate those borrower rights. For example,
the MPN states that “the terms of this Master Promissory Note (MPN) will
be interpreted in accordance with . . . amendments to the HEA [in which the
PSLF program authorization is embedded] and the regulations in accordance
with the effective date of those amendments, and any other applicable
federal laws and regulations.”111 The MPN then similarly states in bold font
that “any amendment to [the HEA] that affects the terms of this MPN will
be applied to your loans in accordance with the effective date of the
amendment.”112
One could argue that this language should be interpreted as justifying
the incorporation of statutory amendments only into new Direct Loans that
are taken out after the effective date of those amendments—not into prior
loans. But this argument will face considerable difficulties. The several
references to “this MPN” in the statutory incorporation language noted
above strongly suggest that statutory amendments to the Higher Education
Act or its implementing regulations will also apply retroactively, impacting
the rights and duties created under earlier loan agreements. Whether
amendments to federal laws and regulations other than the Higher Education
Act, such as the tax laws, would apply retroactively is less clear.113 My
conclusion here is that if one considers only the express terms of the MPN
and not any duties of good faith and fair dealing that would be implied into
the loan contracts to supplement those express terms, nor any additional
lender contractual duties that may be based upon foreseeable borrower
reliance on the loan terms, nor any possible unconscionability-based
reformation of the loan terms (which arguments are each discussed more
110
See MPN (2018), supra note 55, at 8 (explaining the right to forgiveness under PSLF after 120
payments have been made, if employed full-time in certain public service jobs).
111
Id. at 3.
112
Id. at 6.
113
See id. at 6 (noting that the terms and conditions of a loan under the MPN are determined “by
the HEA and other applicable federal laws and regulations”).
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fully below), those MPN terms appear to not preclude retroactive application
of statutory amendments that would limit or eliminate current PSLF program
debt forgiveness privileges or the current tax exemption of forgiven debt for
Direct Loan borrowers who took out those loans prior to the effective date
of those amendments.
In other words, under the express terms of the MPN these Direct Loan
borrowers would not have contractual rights that could not be unilaterally
modified or rescinded by statute. Let me note here that there is a reasonable
case to be made that the express terms of the MPN are not clear enough to
permit the retroactive imposition of statutory limitations of PSLF program
debt forgiveness rights or the imposition of less favorable tax treatment for
forgiven debt. That argument has some plausibility and appeal given the
vagueness and generality of the references to possible later-enacted statutes
in the MPN. But in my opinion, it is not likely to prevail.
The DOE in its 2008 regulations implementing the PSLF program rather
summarily also took the position that the express terms of the MPN do not
provide Direct Loan borrowers with a contractual right to invoke the
program’s debt forgiveness terms.114 A later short 2016 study by the
AccessLex Institute also reached the same conclusion.115 Finding support in
the express MPN terms for vested borrower rights that are not subject to
legislative abridgement appears to be an uphill struggle. However, there are
at least three other promising contract law avenues to explore, one or more
of which may suffice to establish contractual borrower rights to debt
forgiveness and favorable tax treatment thereof, at least for a subset of Direct
Loan borrowers if not all of them. None of these alternative theories of

114

This position appears in the “discussion” published with the final rule:
With regard to incorporating a description of the public service loan forgiveness
benefit in the MPN, the Department is already taking steps to refer to the program in
the MPN and other program documents. However, the MPN will continue to state, as
it currently does, that the terms and conditions of the loans are subject to the HEA as
it is amended in accordance with the effective date of those amendments. Although
there is no history in the program of Congress eliminating or reducing a borrower
benefit, the Department does not believe that a reference to the public service loan
forgiveness program in the MPN would provide the borrower with a contractual right
to the benefit should Congress take action to eliminate that benefit from the HEA as
of a particular effective date.

Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 63232, 63242 (Oct. 23, 2008).
115
See Policy Analysis: Impact of Potential Changes to Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program,
ACCESSLEX INSTITUTE 2 (2016), https://www.accesslex.org/index.php/policy-analysis-impact-ofpotential-changes-to-public-service-loan-forgiveness-program (“[T]he MPN does not appear to provide
any contractual rights on its face that protect against the qualifying terms and conditions . . . being
modified prior to the satisfaction of the 120-payment requirement. In fact, the MPN provides clear notice
that any amendments to the HEA will be incorporated into the terms of the MPN.”).
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contractual obligation appear to have been considered by either the DOE or
the AccessLex Institute. Let me turn to these alternative theories.
B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Argument
As discussed above, the express terms of the current MPN should, and
probably would, be interpreted to not impose any contractual obligation on
the federal government to allow existing Direct Loan borrowers the benefit
of current PSLF terms116 or favorable tax laws.117 Nevertheless, there is case
law holding the government liable for breach of contract, even absent
violation of any express contractual terms, on the basis of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.118 In Centex v. United States, for
example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that this covenant was
implied into governmental contracts with a private party, and that the
covenant imposed a duty upon the government “not to act so as to destroy
the reasonable expectations of the other party as to the fruits of the
contract.”119
This implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing therefore imposes
limits on the ability of the government to retroactively alter the terms of
Direct Loan agreements by statute. For example, consider the extreme
situation that would be presented by the passage of a statute that unilaterally
increased the fixed interest rate on previously executed Direct Loans by a
significant amount above the rate to which the borrowers had agreed. Such
a statute would technically conform to the express MPN terms that arguably
allow, without restriction, statutory changes with retroactive impacts on loan
terms.120 However, such an attempt by the government to unilaterally impose
a much higher interest rate on prior borrowers than what was originally
agreed to would surely be regarded by the courts as contrary to the
reasonable expectations of typical borrowers—specifically, that their
interest payment obligations under a nominally fixed interest rate loan
agreement would remain unchanged for the term of the loan. It would
therefore be in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Another way to state this conclusion would be to say that the
borrowers have an implied contractual right to be charged no more than the
originally agreed interest rate.
In a similar fashion, for those many borrowers who have large student
loans and who later take relatively low-paying qualifying public service
jobs, such as many law school and medical school graduates, either the
116

See supra Section III.A.
See supra text accompanying note 45 (explaining the tax consequences under the current PSLF).
118
Centex Corp. v. United States, 38 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
119
Id. at 1304.
117
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termination of PSLF privileges or the elimination of the tax exemption for
forgiven debt under this program, would have severe adverse financial
consequences that would be economically equivalent to a rather large
unilateral increase in their fixed interest payment obligations.121 Such
statutes should arguably be judicially regarded in a similar manner as being
a violation of the borrowers’ contractual rights created by that implied
covenant.
Despite the express MPN language that is arguably textually sufficient
to allow retroactive incorporation of later legislative enactments,122 the
typical student loan borrower does not (and probably could not) give the fine
print of the extensive and detailed MPN loan documentation the close,
lawyerly reading that would reveal such risks.123 The typical Direct Loan
borrower is young and financially relatively inexperienced and gives
detailed loan documentation only a cursory reading at best before signing
it.124 Those typical borrowers would generally expect (and would arguably
be reasonable in doing so) that not only would their initial fixed interest
payment obligations remain unchanged, but that they would also to be able
to later avail themselves of the PSLF program’s debt forgiveness terms and
the relevant tax law provisions that existed at the time of their loan. The
substantial curtailment or elimination of those debt forgiveness terms or tax
benefits would be just as devastating to them as would be a large unilateral
interest rate increase. They might understand that later-enacted statutes
could impact their subsequent disclosure or other technical regulatory
compliance obligations in some fashion, perhaps significantly increasing
their burdens in these regards, but they would probably not anticipate that
121
For example, consider a law school graduate with a (not unusual) $150,000 combined
undergraduate and graduate student debt load at an average 7% annual interest rate who took a qualifying
$50,000 per year public service job and enrolled in the PAYE repayment plan. If one assumes a typical
disposable income of approximately $30,000 per year, this person would repay approximately only
$3,000 per year under the PAYE plan and owe $225,000 after ten years of payments due to the significant
negative amortization (without capitalization of the unpaid interest) of their $10,500 annual interest
payment obligations on the loans. If the PSLF program was statutorily abolished retroactively to require
continuing repayment of at a 7% interest rate, this additional burden of $225,000 would be the economic
equivalent of a very high initial interest rate on the original $150,000. Even only the lesser change of
removing the tax exemption for debt forgiven under the PSLF program would impose on that graduate a
large one-time tax bill of approximately $75,000—a significant burden indeed for most people who have
worked for at least ten years in modestly compensated public service positions.
122
See MPN (2018), supra note 55, at 3 (“The terms of this Master Promissory Note (MPN) will
be interpreted in accordance with the HEA . . . , ED’s regulations, any amendments to the HEA and the
regulations in accordance with the effective date of those amendments, and other applicable federal laws
and regulations.”).
123
See Amanda Harmon Cooley, Promissory Education: Reforming the Federal Student Loan
Counseling Process to Promote Informed Access and to Reduce Student Debt Burdens, 46 CONN. L. REV.
119, 121 (2013) (stating that most student loan borrowers do not carefully consider “the legal obligations
that they accept as conditions to receiving student loan funds”).
124
Id. at 121–22.
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statutory changes might be retroactively imposed on their loan agreements
that would radically and adversely alter its basic financial parameters.
It is possible that a court determining whether Direct Loan borrowers
had contractual rights to debt forgiveness and current tax benefits, in the face
of an attempted statutory curtailment of those privileges, might elect to apply
the “reasonable expectations” criterion under this implied covenant to the
particular litigants before the court.125 It might do so in a fact-specific
manner rather than in a more conventional “objective” manner based on
hypothetical average contracting party characteristics, even though the latter
approach is quite commonly used in many contexts for legal assessment of
the “reasonableness” of conduct. Rather than postulating a hypothetical
reasonable borrower and then determining whether that hypothetical person
had a reasonable expectation of debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment
meriting protection of contractual rights, the court might require the litigant
before it to provide sufficient subjective evidence that he or she did in fact
have reasonable expectations of having a contractual right to debt
forgiveness, and a right to the current favorable tax treatment thereof.
Under this judicial approach, litigants asserting that they had these
contractual rights under the MPN’s implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing would have the considerable burden of providing sufficient evidence
to establish a favorable position on each of six legal issues: (1) whether they
were aware of the PSLF program debt forgiveness terms set forth in the
MPN when they executed their loan documents; (2) if so, whether they
expected that their rights to utilize those debt forgiveness terms would
survive a later legislative amendment that would attempt to curtail those
rights; (3) if so, whether such expectations were reasonable given their
degree of legal sophistication; (4) whether they were aware when they
executed their loan documents of the favorable tax treatment accorded to
debt forgiven under the PSLF program; (5) if so, whether they expected that
their rights to invoke those tax benefits would survive a later legislative
amendment that would attempt to curtail those rights; and (6) if so, whether
such expectations were reasonable given their degree of legal sophistication.
Under such a fact-specific “reasonable expectations” inquiry, only those
persons who could satisfy the first three issues noted above by providing
sufficient evidence that they were aware of the current PSLF program debt
forgiveness benefits, and that they reasonably expected those benefits to be
contractual rights, would be accorded a contractual right to those benefits.
In similar fashion, only those persons who could satisfy the second three
issues noted above by providing sufficient evidence that they were aware of
the favorable tax treatment of debt forgiven under the PSLF programs, and
125
See Reasonable-Expectations Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The
principle that an ambiguous or inconspicuous term in a contract should be interpreted to favor the weaker
party's objectively reasonable expectations from the contract, even though the explicit language of the
terms may not support those expectations.”).
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that they reasonably expected those tax terms to be contractual rights, would
be accorded a contractual right to that tax treatment.
A judicial requirement for such fact-specific showings would be
devastating to the implied covenant argument for most borrowers. These
fact-heavy inquiries regarding each of perhaps numerous loan transactions
taking place as long as ten years earlier could be made by at most only a
small proportion of those borrowers. This requirement would probably, as a
practical matter, be tantamount to rejecting the argument that these two
contractual rights exist on the basis of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
There are clear advantages of judicial economy of making a single
blanket ruling on this question of the existence of implied covenant-based
contractual rights that would apply equally to all Direct Loan borrowers. For
example, this blanket ruling would avoid the need for a great deal of factspecific litigation as to the understandings and intent of specific borrowers,
and thus a court might be willing to make this “reasonable expectations”
determination on the “objective” criteria of a hypothetical “average” Direct
Loan borrower.126 If so, that court might conclude that the hypothetical
borrower was aware of and expected to be able to invoke the PSLF
program’s debt forgiveness terms and that these expectations were
reasonable, thus recognizing contractual rights under the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
This “objective reasonable expectations” argument would be less
powerful in establishing a contractual right that would preclude the
retroactive application of a change in the IRS Code that would limit or
eliminate the favorable tax treatment of forgiven debt under the PSLF
program. The MPN refers explicitly to the PSLF program’s debt forgiveness
benefits but makes no explicit reference to the favorable tax treatment of that
forgiven debt that would make borrowers aware of those benefits or set
expectations that those benefits would be available years later, at the time of
debt forgiveness.127 In addition, given the general broad judicial acceptance
(and reasonably wide public recognition) of the view that amendments to the
IRS Code that have adverse retroactive effects upon particular taxpayers are
permitted,128 an argument can be made that any expectations that the relevant
tax laws will remain unchanged are unreasonable and should not be
judicially protected.

126

See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (describing the average loan borrower).
See MPN (2018), supra note 55, at 13 (detailing PSLF loan forgiveness).
128
See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 27, 32 (1994) (holding that the retroactive
application of a federal tax amendment did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
127
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C. The Promissory Estoppel Argument
If the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing argument is held
to be too narrow to provide contractual rights to debt forgiveness current tax
benefits, the essence of the argument set forth above can be presented in a
slightly different guise. Another legal doctrine which might provide
contractual protection for borrower expectations is the broadly accepted
doctrine of promissory estoppel.129
Under the promissory estoppel principle, if (1) the government should
“reasonably expect” that a Direct Loan borrower would rely upon a promise
of later availability of the current PSLF program debt forgiveness terms and
their favorable tax treatment, and (2) the borrower does so rely, either in
taking out the loan or in later accepting public service employment, then the
government will have to recognize the borrower’s contractual right to invoke
those terms to the extent “justice requires.”130 The focus of the inquiry here
would be whether the government should reasonably expect borrower
reliance upon the later availability of those terms, rather than upon the
reasonableness of the borrowers’ expectations in relying upon those terms,
which would be the focus of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inquiry discussed above. If the court were to determine that the
government should reasonably expect borrower reliance (whether or not the
borrowers have behaved reasonably in so relying), then the final issue
presented would be whether the justice would demand contractual
enforcement of debt forgiveness and tax treatment terms, in whole or in part.
The reasonableness of the borrower’s reliance could, however, be a relevant
factor in this final determination as to what resolution of the question most
furthers justice.
The principles of promissory estoppel apply to impose contractual
obligations upon the federal government in the same manner as they apply
to private parties.131 The law draws a distinction when a party seeks to utilize
the earlier and related doctrine of equitable estoppel to bind the government
to fraudulent or mistaken representations of its agents. The courts, under
such circumstances, will not hold the government liable for those
representations unless the agent was acting within the scope of his or her

129
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.”).
130
Id.
131
Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000) (“[W]hen the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law
applicable to contracts between private individuals.” (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S.
839, 895 (1996))).
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authority. However, when a promissory estoppel claim is based on the
authorized promissory representations of a government agent, the rules
governing private parties apply.133
The promissory estoppel argument is interesting, but there are several
plausible counter-arguments against this basis for establishing contractual
rights. For one, the express terms of the MPN simply do not promise that the
PSLF program’s terms will be available indefinitely, nor do they reference
any restrictions on tax changes. The MPN instead makes it reasonably clear
to a legally sophisticated reader that later legislative enactments may
retroactively limit or even eliminate these debt forgiveness and tax
privileges.134 If MPN makes no promises in these respects, this would
sharply undercut the promissory estoppel rationale for imposing contractual
obligations on the government.
A second, related counter-argument would be that any promises the
MPN makes as to the future availability of current PSLF terms or favorable
tax treatment, the MPN expressly makes subject to later legislative
enactments.135 It may be reasonable for the government to expect typical
student loan borrowers without legal training to overlook the hedged nature
of these conditional “promises” and to rely upon them as though they were
unconditional commitments. But borrower reliance on a mere hope that
program terms and tax laws will remain unchanged, despite the MPN’s
express references to possible later limiting enactments, is unreasonable.
Even if the government should foresee such (unreasonable) reliance to take
place, justice arguably does not require the courts to order the government
to meet people’s unreasonable contractual expectations.
Finally, the promissory estoppel argument raises the subsidiary question
of whether to prevail on this argument, a borrower should have to prove
actual subjective reliance on continuing availability of PSLF terms and
favorable tax treatment, or whether such reliance will be determined by
whether an objectively reasonable, hypothetical “average” borrower would
have so relied. As with the earlier, similar discussion of implied covenant, if
a borrower must prove actual reliance, this would bar most borrowers from
a favorable finding.
D. The Unconscionability Argument
Finally, even if the MPN terms are interpreted to permit the government
to subject borrowers to later-enacted legislation that would significantly alter
132

Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419–20 (1990).
Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 607.
134
See MPN (2018), supra note 55, at 6 (“NOTE: Any amendment to the Act that affects the terms
of this MPN will be applied to your loans in accordance with the effective date of the amendment.”).
135
Id.
133
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their PSLF program and favorable tax law privileges—even after
considering the implied covenant and promissory estoppel theories of
contractual obligation discussed above—a final argument can be made that
such contractual alterations should not be allowed because they are so unfair
and surprising to borrowers as to be unconscionable.136 This argument would
be based on the idea that the MPN provisions that allow for retroactive
legislative alterations of loan terms and tax treatment present both
procedural and substantive unfairness, satisfying the usual judicial
requirement for unconscionability that both forms of unfairness be present
to a significant degree.137 If a court accepted this argument, it could then
reform the loan agreements by refusing to enforce the MPN provisions that
allow for unilateral statutory amendment. This would effectively give
borrowers a contractual right to debt forgiveness and the favorable tax
treatment thereof.
The procedural unfairness argument would be that the terse and
legalistic MPN provisions relating to the possibility of alteration of the loan
terms by subsequent legislation do not clearly reveal to typical borrowers,
who lack legal training, the increased burden they could face. This argument
would once again present the related sub-issue of whether a fact-specific
showing by individual borrowers would be required by courts. Will those
borrowers who cannot demonstrate that they were unaware of the possibility
of such retroactive legislation at the time they took out their loans be
regarded differently and less favorably than those less-sophisticated
borrowers who can somehow demonstrate that they were not consciously
aware of this risk?
A class action unconscionability challenge to a later-enacted statute that
curtails debt forgiveness rights may therefore be required by the courts to
subdivide the plaintiff class with regard to the awareness issue. Once again,
if courts required that borrowers be able to provide sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that they were unaware, at the time of contract formation, of the
existence and significance of the MPN terms that make borrower privileges
conditional with regard to later statutory amendments, this would be quite
burdensome and would likely defeat virtually all borrower claims. However,
once again, judicial economy might cause courts to instead apply their
determination of the extent of knowledge and understanding of a
hypothetical “average” Direct Loan borrower for all such unconscionability
claims.
136

U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“The principle is one of
the prevention of . . . unfair surprise.”).
137
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[W]hen
a party of little bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no
knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent . . . was ever given to all the terms. In such a
case . . . the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should
be withheld.”).
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The substantive unfairness portion of the unconscionability argument
would focus on the major financial implications of the loss of those debt
forgiveness and tax treatment privileges for borrowers, as compared to the
size of the loan obligations they originally undertook. This argument might
also present a related sub-issue: Should high-debt borrowers (such as many
law school and medical school graduates), who would suffer greatly from
the loss of debt forgiveness, be treated differently than those with more
modest loan balances, who would not be as strongly impacted? The
difference in the significance of losing these privileges may call for another
partition of an unconscionability class action into two (or more) groups of
different lawsuits on this particular issue.
IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POWER TO RETROACTIVELY LIMIT PSLF
PROGRAM DEBT FORGIVENESS AND REMOVE THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR
FORGIVEN DEBT
If a court were to determine that current Direct Loan borrowers do not
have vested contractual rights to later avail themselves of the PSLF program
debt forgiveness privilege or the current tax law treatment of forgiven debts,
there do not appear to be any constitutional limitations sufficient to bar
enforcement of a federal statute that would retroactively terminate that
privilege. But if the program’s debt forgiveness terms were left in place and
the current tax exemption were eliminated, it is a closer call whether such
legislation would pass constitutional due process scrutiny, although I believe
that it probably would.
The courts have long permitted tax legislation with retroactive impact
for some taxpayers.138 Since as early as 1880, taxation for a public purpose
is not a taking of private property in violation of the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.139 In addition, a taxpayer’s mere reliance upon an existing tax
provision remaining in force is insufficient to establish that a tax law change
is a constitutional violation.140 However, on occasion, a tax law change with
retroactive impact has been challenged as a substantive due process violation
on the basis that the length of the period of retroactivity reaching back from
the date of statutory enactment is excessive.141
Most tax legislation is made retroactive only to the beginning of the year
of enactment, and such legislation has been routinely upheld against

138
See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30–32 (1994) (finding that the 1987
amendment’s retroactive application did not violate due process).
139
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880).
140
Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33 (“Tax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in
the Internal Revenue Code.”).
141
See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938) (describing the appellant’s argument that a
1935 tax law denied him due process by imposing a tax on income received in 1933).
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142

substantive due process challenges. However, tax laws that reach back
further than one year are, on rare occasions, successfully challenged on
substantive due process grounds. For example, in Nichols v. Coolidge, the
Supreme Court disallowed the retroactive application of an estate tax
provision that changed the tax treatment of a property transfer that had taken
place twelve years earlier.143 In a later case, the Supreme Court endorsed this
ruling and contrasted it with the different result reached in many other
instances where the “retroactive effect is limited.”144
A change in the tax laws governing debt forgiven under the PSLF
program would potentially have retroactive effects for some borrowers
going as far back as 1994 when the Direct Loan program first went into
effect,145 thus far exceeding the twelve years of retroactive application found
to be unacceptable in Nichols v. Coolidge. This potentially long period of
retroactivity exists because while a borrower must have worked for ten years
in qualifying public service after October 1, 2007 to obtain debt forgiveness,
if the borrower meets that requirement he will be able to have any remaining
balance on any Direct Loans forgiven, even if some or all of those loans
were taken out prior to October 1, 2007.146 As a practical matter, the large
majority of Direct Loans that will be forgiven under the PSLF program
starting in October of 2017 will be post-2007 loans that the borrower will
have taken out within ten years or less of the time of seeking debt
forgiveness. However, there will likely also be some borrowers who seek
forgiveness for Direct Loans taken out more than ten years earlier that were
only partially repaid under extended twenty or twenty-five year incomebased loan repayment plans. Thus, a tax law change here could conceivably
have retroactive impact for a taxpayer extending back as far as 1994!
However, it was not until the PSLF program was adopted in 2007 that a
Direct Loan borrower could have formed an expectation of PSLF program
debt forgiveness and the tax exemption of this forgiven debt, so perhaps it
would be more appropriate to regard the period of retroactive impact of a tax
law change as extending back only to October 1, 2007 when those
expectations of debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment could have first
arisen, even if some of the loan debts that would later be forgiven were
incurred well prior to that date. Still, even if framed this way, such a statute
would impose a retroactive period of up to at least ten years—longer for
some borrowers if the hypothetical new tax law is adopted after 2017—and
142
See, e.g., United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299–300 (1981) (per curiam) (“Congress
possessed ample authority to make this kind of change effective as of the beginning of the year of
enactment.”).
143
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1927).
144
Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34.
145
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 9–15.
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therefore would perhaps be open to challenge on substantive due process
grounds under the rationale of Nichols v. Coolidge.147 But I doubt that such
an argument would prove successful given the broad judicial support for
retroactive tax laws148 and the large revenue consequences of invalidating
such a statute, which I have previously estimated would recapture onequarter to one-third of the $12 billion to $18 billion per year of forgiven
debt.
For the remainder of this Part, I will assume for the sake of argument
that under one or more of the legal theories discussed above, at least some
Direct Loan borrowers do have contractual rights, both to utilize the current
PSLF program terms and favorable tax treatment of debt forgiven. Does the
contractual status of those borrowers’ rights affect the federal government’s
ability to retroactively terminate one or both of those rights under the
Constitution without providing compensation to the adversely affected
borrowers? My conclusion here is that these contractual rights would each
be regarded as “private property” and protected against retroactive statutory
elimination by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.149
The Constitution’s Contracts Clause prohibits any state government
from adopting a law that would impair its contractual obligations,150 but it
has long been recognized that this provision applies only to the states and
not to the federal government.151 Any constitutional challenge to federal
statutes that impair the contractual rights of a private party in a contract with
the federal government, such as the contractual rights assumed here, would
have to be based on a violation of the Takings Clause of the Constitution,
which prohibits the taking of private property without providing just
compensation.152
Contract rights are generally deemed “private property” as that phrase
is used in the Takings Clause,153 but there are important exceptions to this
general rule. For example, in Bowen v. POSSE, the Supreme Court stated in
sweeping terms that contractual arrangements, including those to which a
sovereign itself is a party, remain subject to subsequent legislation.154 The
147

See supra note 143.
See, e.g., Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30–31 (stating that the Supreme Court “repeatedly has upheld
retroactive tax legislation against a due process challenge”).
149
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken . . . without just compensation.”).
150
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . .”).
151
Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations and Vested Rights, 6 MARQ. L. REV.
129, 129 (1922).
152
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
153
Id. See also U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (“Contract rights are a form
of property and as such may be taken . . . provided that just compensation is paid.”); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (“Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private
individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.”).
154
Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
148
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Court held that the contractual right of the State of California to terminate
its participation in the Social Security system did not constitute a property
right within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,155 but that such a right
remained “subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and [that sovereign power]
will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.”156 The Bowen
court distinguished this lesser right from the hardier property rights that
would be created by a contractual debt of the government or by a
government obligation to otherwise provide benefits under a contract.157
Under Bowen, if the Direct Loan borrowers have a contractual right to
invoke PSLF debt forgiveness as I am assuming here, this right would appear
to be a governmental obligation to provide benefits, and the government’s
right to unilaterally alter or terminate those benefits has been “surrendered
in unmistakable terms.”158 That right would, therefore, deserve the usual
“private property” protections of the Takings Clause and would bar its
termination by statute without the government providing compensation.
Similarly, if these Direct Loan borrowers also have a contractual right to the
currently favorable tax exemption for forgiven debt, under Bowen this right
would also appear to be a government obligation to provide benefits,
meriting the same Takings Clause protection. The retroactive taxation
jurisprudence briefly discussed above that broadly allows the adoption of
tax laws with retroactive impact (if the period of retroactivity is not
excessively long) does not appear to be applicable here because those prior
cases allowing for retroactive measures do not address the unusual
circumstances assumed to be present where the government has specifically
contracted to provide a certain tax treatment for a transaction.
CONCLUSION
As I have discussed above, I believe that the express language of the
MPN should be interpreted to allow the government to retroactively impose
statutory limitations upon, or even eliminate, PSLF program debt
forgiveness privileges for prior Direct Loan borrowers159 and to change the
tax laws applicable to any later forgiven debt. Direct Loan borrowers do not
appear to have an express contractual right to either debt forgiveness or
favorable tax treatment of forgiven debt.
Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however,
some borrowers can make a fairly strong case that they have an implied
contractual right to debt forgiveness and current favorable tax treatment of
debt so forgiven. If not all borrowers have this right, then it should be
155

Id. at 55.
Id. at 52 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
157
Id. at 55 (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 576–77).
158
Id. at 52 (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148).
159
The DOE and the AccessLex Institute are of the same opinion here. See supra notes 114–15 and
accompanying text.
156
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recognized at least for those few borrowers who can demonstrate that they
reasonably expected to have such contractual rights when they entered into
their loan agreements.
In addition, a related but distinct argument can be made that the
government should be bound by promissory estoppel principles of
contractual commitments to honor those debt forgiveness and tax treatment
privileges originally articulated in the Direct Loan documentation—again,
if not for all borrowers, then at least for those who can demonstrate that they
actually relied upon later having those rights when they entered into their
loan agreements or took public service employment. However, as I have
noted, there are several strong counter-arguments that can be made against
imposing contractual liability on the government here on a promissory
estoppel theory.
Finally, a fairly robust unconscionability challenge can be mounted
against enforcement of MPN terms that allow for retroactive elimination of
PSLF debt forgiveness by later-enacted statutes, seeking reformation of
those contracts to protect borrowers against such statutes—if not for all
borrowers, then at least for high-debt borrowers who can demonstrate that
they were both unaware of this possibility at the time of contracting and who
would be severely impacted by the loss or substantial curtailment of their
debt forgiveness rights.
In summary, I think that it is an open question whether the courts would
regard the PSLF program terms as a contractual obligation of the
government under the post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loan agreements (rather
than as merely a revocable privilege) under one or more of the above
contractual theories of liability if this matter were litigated in the context of
retroactive statutory curtailment or elimination of those privileges. I have
considered several arguments that could be made in this regard, and while
some of them have considerable merit, at least for a small subset of Direct
Loan borrowers, the proper resolution of the question as a matter of positive
law is unclear. For the reasons that I have discussed, however, I think that it
is much less likely that the courts would regard the privilege of favorable tax
treatment of debt forgiven under the PSLF program as a contractual
obligation of the government.
If one assumes for the sake of argument that the existence of borrower
contractual rights to both debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment can
be justified by one or more of the above theories, that raises the difficult
question as to whether the federal government then still has the power under
the Constitution to retroactively abrogate one or both of those contractual
rights by statute. I have concluded that a strong case can be made that if
borrowers have contractual rights both to debt forgiveness and to the current
favorable tax treatment of forgiven debt, these rights should be regarded as
property rights that cannot be retroactively abrogated without the payment
of compensation under the Takings Clause.
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The Obama Administration’s 2014 proposal to limit PSLF program
eligibility was not adopted,160 nor was the 2017 Trump Administration
proposal to prospectively abolish the PSLF program altogether for most
Direct Loans taken out as of July 1, 2018.161 But given the large annual cost
this program is likely to impose upon the Treasury once substantial numbers
of people begin to obtain debt forgiveness, and given the regressive
distribution of the benefits of the program’s benefits in favor of mid-career
lawyers and doctors, there are likely to be attempts to statutorily curtail or
eliminate this program—or to reduce or eliminate its favorable tax
benefits—in a manner that will have retroactive impacts upon prior Direct
Loan borrowers.
Finally, if such statutes with retroactive impacts are adopted, there will
surely be court challenges to those statutes asserted along the lines of the
arguments that I have outlined above. Such challenges will present not only
difficult legal issues but also hard policy questions as to how to best balance
the widespread reliance of existing borrowers to have their debt forgiven
against legitimate public concerns regarding the program’s costs and
regressive benefits.
I do not have strong feelings or any special insights as to how this
tension should be resolved. I do suggest for discussion one possible
compromise approach: Congress could adopt a statute which continues
unchanged the PSLF program’s debt forgiveness eligibility and benefits but
treats debts forgiven under the program as taxable income, as is now done
for the other federal income-based loan repayment programs. Such a statute
would immediately recapture approximately one-quarter to one-third of the
debt forgiveness benefits in new income tax revenues and would do so in a
modestly progressive manner as it imposed larger taxes on higher-debt (and
presumably also higher-earning) lawyers and doctors. This approach would,
however, create a troubling impact in that many persons would be burdened
with potentially substantial income tax obligations without the funds to pay
those taxes.162 For the typical undergraduate borrower with a $30,000 initial
loan debt and approximately $25,000 of debt forgiven,163 this would impose
a tax liability of approximately $5,000 to $6,000—a significant but not
crushing financial obligation. For lawyers or doctors with upwards of
$200,000 of debt forgiven,164 however, tax bills could easily be as high as
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See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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See Crespi (2016), supra note 25, for an extensive discussion of the comparable tax bomb that
will be imposed by the PAYE and Income-Based Repayment plans on high-debt law school graduates
when millions of Direct Loan borrowers will have their remaining debts forgiven under one or another
of those plans after either twenty or twenty-five years of making repayments.
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See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing calculation of student loan debt).
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See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing average student loan debt for law school
students).
161

670

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:3

$50,000 to $70,000 or more, which may well be beyond some persons’
capacity to pay.
In an earlier article, I analyzed the comparable impacts for high-debt law
school graduates of large forgiven debts of $200,000 or more being treated
as taxable income under the PAYE and Income-Based Repayment plans
after either twenty or twenty-five years, as they now are. There, I suggested
that the Code should perhaps be revised to give these persons several years
to pay these taxes, with only a modest interest rate imposed for the privilege
of making deferred payments, rather than requiring that the taxes all be paid
in the year of discharge.165 The argument for a comparable deferred payment
provision to be included in any repeal of the PSLF program tax exemption
is even stronger, given that these persons will generally have had only about
ten years to set aside funds in anticipation of these taxes, and moreover they
will have had to do so out of relatively modest public service salaries. This
in contrast to having twenty or twenty-five years to build up a dedicated fund
out of often larger public or private sector incomes to pay these taxes, as
borrowers have for the other income-based repayment plans. Another
possible mitigating statutory option here would be to allow those persons
who have debts forgiven under the PSLF program to elect to pay those taxes
over time in accordance with the terms of their prior loan repayment
program, thereby giving them another ten to fifteen years to repay their tax
debt at the original student loan interest rate. This approach would be
equivalent to forgiving two-thirds to three-quarters of their loan debt without
imposing any tax obligation and then requiring repayment of the balance of
the debt on the same terms as before. There would thus be no large tax
imposed in the year in which the remaining debts are (partially) forgiven.
The borrower would continue to make smaller loan repayments for another
ten to fifteen years until any remaining debt is forgiven, and then that
forgiven debt would be treated as taxable income in the year of final
forgiveness as the tax laws now require.
There are of course numerous other possible compromises to balance
the competing legitimate interests of borrowers with the interests of the
general taxpaying public. Whatever the resolution, the sooner these
questions are resolved, the better for all concerned given the virtual flood of
applications for debt forgiveness under the PSLF program that is almost
upon us.
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